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Abstract 
Huber, Michaela (Ph.D., Department of Psychology and Neuroscience) 
From mindless to mindful decision making: Reflecting on prescriptive processes 
 
Thesis directed by Leaf Van Boven, Associate Professor, Department of 
Psychology and Neuroscience 
 
People frequently make judgments and decisions in ways that, in hindsight, they 
might prefer to have made differently.  Their judgments and decisions may be 
strongly influenced by some attributes that people would prefer receive less 
weight (e.g. transient emotions, peripheral cues, and social influence), and 
people may neglect other attributes that they would prefer receive more weight 
(e.g. factual information, subjective experiences, and personal preference).  The 
central claim in this dissertation is that asking people to reflect on prescriptive 
decision processes—how decisions should be made—elicits a psychological state 
of mindfulness where people are increasingly aware of and better able to correct 
decisional influences.  Such mindfulness thus improves the subjective quality of 
decisions.  Six experiments examine how introspection-induced mindfulness 
changes the weighting of decision attributes and the outcome of decisions in 
various domains including charitable giving (Studies 1 & 5), dating (Studies 2 & 
6), policy evaluations (Study 3), and movie preferences (Study 4).  In each 
experiment, people’s decisions are strongly influenced by some attributes while 
neglecting other attributes, in contrast with people’s beliefs about how decisions 
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should be made.  By inducing mindfulness of prescriptive decision processes, 
people weight the decision attributes in closer accordance with how they think 
decisions should be made in that particular context.  Furthermore, mindfulness 
also promotes increased awareness of decisional influences, which leads to 
judging the quality of decisions differently: a decision that people perceive to be 
consistent with their beliefs about how decisions should be made, is evaluated 
more favorably than a decision that is perceived to be inconsistent with such 
beliefs (Study 6).  
 
Keywords: judgment and decision making, mindfulness, introspection, emotion, 
negativity bias, persuasion 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One fundamental lesson from studying judgment and decision making is 
that the weighting of decision attributes is a critical component for describing 
and evaluating people’s decision processes (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
Some attributes are heavily weighted in the decision process such as emotional 
reactions (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), negative 
information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001), losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), etc. and other attributes 
may not receive much weight at all such as numeric information (Hsee & 
Rottenstreich, 2004), analytic and logical arguments (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002), etc..  Attribute weighting is an important factor in judgment and decision 
making in part because many decisions could easily be improved by changing 
the attribute weighting instead of changing the kind of processing (e.g. from 
intuition to reasoning, Kahneman, 2003) that people engage in when making 
decisions.  In this dissertation, we propose a state of mindfulness where people 
are aware of decision attributes and where they observe how much weight these 
decision attributes receive in their decision making process.  We hypothesize that 
this state leads people then to think about the respective weight that decision 
attributes should get, based on people’s subjective beliefs about how much 
influence attributes should have.  We think that—upon reflection—people have 
beliefs about how much weight decision attributes should get that may differ 
from how much weight people would normally give these attributes.  Using the 
example of a voting decision, we introduce the general idea before we then delve 
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deeper into the theoretical background and lead into studies that examine the 
present hypotheses.   
Imagine that someone is deciding which political candidate to vote for in 
an upcoming election.  People’s voting decisions can be strongly influenced by 
their impression of a candidate, such as a candidate’s attractiveness (Olivola & 
Todorov, 2010).  But would people agree that it should influence voting 
decisions?  The positions that the candidate takes on specific issues such as 
protecting the environment, education, health care, foreign policy may also affect 
people’s voting decisions, but it is an interesting question to ask how much 
candidates’ attractiveness matters relative to their positions on issues matters for 
voting decisions—and most importantly for the present dissertation, how much it 
should matter from the voters’ point of view.   
While a candidate’s attractiveness may affect people’s voting decisions, 
they may not be aware of this effect.  Similarly, while a candidate’s stance on 
specific issues may provide a somewhat weaker influence on a person’s voting 
decision, people may generally also not be aware of this influence.  The 
important point is that people’s voting decisions (and many other judgments and 
decisions) are influenced by various decision attributes, but that people may not 
be aware that these attributes influence their decisions and how much their 
relative influence is.  It seems plausible that people can gain some awareness of 
these attributes and their relative influence.  For example, if people have to 
justify why they voted for one candidate and not another, they may realize that 
some attributes provided undue influence on their judgments and decisions.  If 
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people were mindful of how much these attributes might influence their decision, 
they might change the relative weighting of these attributes.  For the voting 
example, mindful decision makers might become aware that they were basing 
their decisions strongly on their impression of a candidate and less on a 
candidate’s position on specific issues.  This insight may lead them to think 
about whether this weighting is their most preferred weighting and if it is not, 
they may engage in correcting how much their decision is based on their 
impression versus a candidate’s positions on issues.  In this example, we would 
certainly expect that a majority would prefer to make decisions based on a 
candidate’s positions rather than on subjective impressions of the candidate such 
as attractiveness.  
 This dissertation seeks to examine a psychological process of mindful 
judgment and decision making.  The assumption is that people generally process 
information without being aware of the attributes that affect their judgments and 
decisions—and how much they do.  We refer to this psychological state as 
mindlessness because people rely on decision attributes to different degrees 
without being aware of these attributes’ influence on their decisions.  This state 
can be considered the default state of processing for most people and is not to be 
confused with claims about how deep or how much people process, which is an 
important distinction that we come back to throughout this dissertation.  Not 
being aware of decision attributes may certainly often be an adaptive strategy 
that works well for most judgments and decisions in everyday life.  However, we 
hypothesize that people sometimes have a different opinion about how much 
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influence some attributes should have had on their judgments and decisions.  As 
in the voting example, people could come to the conclusion that they were 
strongly affected by the attractiveness of political candidates—and they wish 
they were not, but that they did not put a lot of weight on the candidates’ position 
on important issues—and they wish they did.  
One of the central claims in this dissertation is that some problematic 
aspects in judgment and decision making that arise from a mindless default 
attribute weighting, which is inconsistent with normative weighting can be 
mitigated by changing the weighting of attributes.  We purposefully created 
decision situations where the weight that attributes receive is inconsistent with 
the weight the attributes should have received—according to people’s beliefs 
about the weighting.  We predict that once people are in a mindful as opposed to 
a mindless state, they are aware of the decision attributes, they think about how 
much these attributes should influence the decision (based on their own 
subjective standards), and they change the weighting of these attributes to match 
it with how much weight they think the attributes should get.  It is certainly 
possible to imagine situations where people are not mindful and aware of the 
decision attributes, but where their decisions are perfectly consistent with their 
beliefs about how decisions should be made.  We predict that in these situations, 
mindfulness would not lead to a change in the decision, but mindfulness could 
have additional benefits such as reducing regret about negative outcomes of 
decisions because people made a decision where they were aware of how they 
wanted to make it.  These additional benefits of mindfulness are open for future 
5 
 
research.  In the present research however, we were primarily interested in 
examining the effects of mindfulness on changes in the decision process.  Our 
theoretical reasoning only predicts changes in the attribute weighting if the 
mindless default weighting differs from people’s preferred weighting.  Thus, we 
focused in our empirical investigation on designing paradigms where the default 
weighting is at odds with people’s preferred weighting.   
 
Attention and weighting processes in judgment and decision making 
In a rich, real world environment, there is a lot of information available 
that people could process when they are making decisions.  It is necessary to 
have one’s attention focus on only a smaller subset of the total information 
available.  This is based on the assumption that it would be impossible for 
decision makers to consciously process all the information available, which 
would not be very adaptive (Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1978).1  Attention is 
selecting which subset of this information receives significance in the decision 
making process (Kahneman, 1973).  Attention may be automatically drawn to 
some information and stimuli (depending on goals or on affective states), but 
decision makers can also intentionally direct it to some information (Weber & 
Johnson, 2009).  We adopt the perspective to view attention as a spotlight that 
serves as a selection tool such that information that people attend to receive more 
weight in the decision making process.  How much attention people place on 
                                                
1 This does not imply that people cannot process much of this information 
unconsciously or implicitly and that this information can influence judgments 
and decisions through unconscious or implicit processing.   
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attributes is generally predictive of how much weight these attributes receive in 
the decision.  There could certainly be important other information that would be 
relevant for a decision, but if it is outside this “attention spotlight,” people will 
attend to this information less and thus, weigh this information less in the 
decision process.2   
Attention influences judgment and decision making. Attention is an 
important precursor for decision making—presumably because the information 
that people attend to will get some weight in the decision process (Weber & 
Johnson, 2009).  The following section will present three areas where some 
attributes attract more attention and receive a lot of weight in the decision 
process (emotions, negative information, and group influence and expert opinion 
in persuasion paradigms) compared with other attributes that attract less attention 
and receive less weight.  
Emotions attracts attention.  Emotions draw attention to stimuli or 
features of stimuli.  For example, threat-related and fear-relevant stimuli such as 
snakes capture people’s attention more than positive or neutral stimuli (Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Yiend, 2010).  
Immediately arousing emotional experiences also capture attention more than 
previously experienced emotions and presumably impairing attention to 
subsequent experiences (Derryberry, 1993; Van Boven, White, & Huber, 2009).  
Using eye tracking methods, it has also been found that people orient their 
attention more to emotional pictures compared with neutral pictures 
                                                
2 This does not imply that there are no other mechanisms for the influence of 
attributes on judgment and decision making (e.g. priming).   
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(Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2006).  Another finding shows that directing 
attention to non-arousing aspects of a picture decreases the late positive 
potential, an event related potential related to increased attention to emotional 
stimuli (Dunning & Hajcak, 2009). 
Additionally, emotions not only attract attention, but they also direct 
people’s attention to features of the situation that are relevant for behavior 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Weber & Johnson, 2009).  For 
example, experiencing fear helps focusing on the person or object that arouses 
the fear and facilitates behavioral responses to address the threat.   
In sum, emotions related to the decision outcome, emotional information 
about the decision, or emotions that people experience during the decision 
making process attract more attention than emotionally neutral aspects.  
Therefore, they might receive more weight in the decision process compared 
with other attributes that characterize the decision.  Arguably because emotions 
often serve important signaling functions in social situations and because they 
facilitate behavioral responses, the fact that they attract attention has high 
adaptive value.   
One important area where emotions have a strong effect on judgment and 
decision making is charitable giving.  People give more to those whose suffering 
is more upsetting compared with people whose suffering is relatively less 
upsetting (Batson, 1990).  But such a strong influence of sympathetic emotion on 
donation decisions can be problematic because factors that arouse emotions may 
be independent of the objective severity of suffering.  If factors that are unrelated 
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to the objective suffering contribute to strong emotional reactions in response to 
a crisis, donation decisions might be insensitive to the objective scope of human 
suffering.  Such “scope insensitivity” has been examined in various phenomena 
such as the identifiable victim effect (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003) and the immediacy bias in emotion perception (Huber, Van 
Boven, & McGraw, in press; Van Boven et al., 2009).  The identifiable victim 
effect describes decisions where people are more inclined to make donations that 
alleviate the suffering of a specific, identified individual rather than a group of 
individuals, which is largely attributable to the stronger sympathetic emotions 
evoked by an identifiable victim (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a).  We have recently 
tested whether an immediacy bias in perceived emotions where immediately 
experienced emotions are perceived as more intense than previously experienced 
emotions might produce an immediacy bias in donation decisions (Huber et al., 
in press; Van Boven et al., 2009).  That is, people might be more likely to donate 
resources to alleviate human suffering that happens to arouse immediate 
emotional reactions than to human suffering that happened to have aroused 
previous emotional reactions.  In one test of this prediction, participants watched 
(in random order) two short films portraying humanitarian crises in Africa.  
Directly after viewing the second clip, participants were asked to make ratings of 
how deserving each crisis was for receiving humanitarian aid.  Consistent with 
the immediacy bias, participants perceived as more deserving whichever crisis 
they happened to have learned about second and aroused immediate emotions.  
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Most participants also chose to donate more money to the humanitarian crisis 
they learned about second. 
Although emotion’s influence on donation decisions is undoubtedly 
desirable in many situations, there are many other situations in which people 
might prefer to donate based on objective information such as the number of 
victims.  Again, it is important to keep in mind that an increased weighting of 
objective information is what people would prefer to do once they reflect on the 
way they made the decision.  We examine whether making people mindful of 
emotional reactions and objective information changes their influence when 
making monetary allocations to humanitarian crises.  
Negative information attracts attention.  People exhibit a negativity bias 
in a number of different areas (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001).  In essence, these effects demonstrate that negative information gets more 
weight compared with positive information.  For example, people form negative 
impressions easier than positive impressions (Baumeister et al., 2001 
summarizes these).  When people process information about another person, they 
give a lot of weight to extreme information and to negative information (Fiske, 
1980).  For example, the more unfavorable a trait is, the smaller the number of 
instances required to confirm the negative stereotype and the larger the number 
of instances required to disconfirm it (Rothbart & Park, 1986).  
Again, there is value in processing information with a focus on negative 
information.  Some information about other people is more diagnostic than other 
information (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).  For example, if someone wants to 
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know how friendly another person is, it may not be very informative to know 
which major this person chose in college.  However, it may be very useful and 
informative to know what someone’s friends think about this person.  In addition 
to the usefulness of some categories of information, valence conveys important 
diagnostic information.  Negative information is more diagnostic according to 
Skowronski and Carlston’s (1989) category diagnosticity approach, because even 
just a few negative behaviors are enough to categorize someone as a “bad” 
person while a few positive behaviors are not enough to be categorized as a 
“good” person.   
Thus, negative information and is weighted more, it attracts people’s 
attention through an automatic vigilance mechanism (Pratto & John, 1991), and 
it has a greater impact on evaluations compared with positive information (Ito, 
Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998).   
Even though the negativity bias occurs in part because of negative 
information’s diagnostic value, there can be situations where the negativity bias 
leads to problematic judgments and decisions.3  A classic illustration is the Asian 
disease framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  In this paradigm, the 
number of people affected by the outbreak of a disease is either framed in terms 
of how many people will be saved or how many people will die.  There are two 
courses of action and both are presented to participants either in a “people saved” 
                                                
3 It is interesting that this attention to negative information is often referred to as 
a “negativity bias,” which suggests that the literature on this topic views this 
effect as a systematic error in judgment.  In judgment and decision making, 
biases are defined as deviations from rational choice and they are thought to be 
the outcome of using heuristics (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002).   
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or in a “people die” framing.  A majority chooses the course of action that saves 
200 people (out of a total of 600 people, which kills 400 people), but participants 
avoid the very same course of action when 400 will be killed (again, out of a 
total of 600 people, which saves 200 people).  Clearly the information about the 
courses of action is exactly the same—the only difference is that the framing or 
presentation of this information differs.  
Furthermore, there are different categories of information such as valence 
and relevance.  Imagine there are two pieces of information that people can use 
to make a decision.  In one scenario, the relevant piece of information is negative 
and a less relevant piece of information is positive.  In this situation, the relevant 
information will receive a lot of weight because of the negativity bias, which in 
this situation is beneficial because people probably want to give relevant 
information a lot of weight.  In a different scenario, the relevant piece of 
information is positive and a less relevant piece of information is negative.  In 
this scenario, the relevant information may receive less weight because the 
negativity bias leads people to attend more to the moderately relevant 
information.  Again, we argue that the weighting in line with the negativity bias 
would not be people’s preference for the ideal weighting, given the relevance of 
the information.  
Group influence and expert opinion in persuasion.  Among the many 
sources of persuasive influence, group influence and expert opinions are 
influential in changing people’s attitudes (Asch, 1955; Petty & Wegener, 1999).  
Specifically, political group influence has been shown to be more influential than 
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people’s ideologies or the attitude object itself (Cohen, 2003).  In a typical 
paradigm, participants read about a welfare policy and they either received 
information that Republicans in the House of Representatives supported the 
policy or that Democrats supported it.  A third group of participants did not 
receive any information on which political party supported the policy.  In the 
control condition, participants evaluated the policy based on the policy’s content 
and how well it matched their political ideology: Democratic participants 
supported a generous welfare policy (e.g full medical assistance, 2 years of paid 
tuition at a community college, etc.) more than Republican participants.  In 
contrast, when participants received information on which political party in the 
House of Representatives supports the policy, their evaluation of the policy 
matched the position of their political ingroup (e.g. if Democrats in the House of 
Representatives supported the policy, Democratic participants were more likely 
to evaluate the policy more positively).  This finding shows that social groups 
shape the meaning of the attitude object (Cohen, 2003).  Attitudes certainly do 
not simply develop from objective information about the attitude object alone 
and information about how social groups evaluate the attitude object is an 
important factor in the development of an attitude (Asch, 1955).   
This impact of group influence may often be a sensible strategy because 
the position of social groups can be relevant information, complementing 
information on the content of the attitude object itself.  On the other hand, one 
can also easily imagine situations where people would like to evaluate a policy 
without being strongly influenced by group influence—especially when attitudes 
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can be so dramatically different for the very same policy simply as a function of 
group influence as demonstrated by Cohen (2003).  
There are several peripheral cues known to affect persuasion such as the 
credibility and the attractiveness of the source (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Wegener, 
1999).  Based on commonly used models, there are two routes to persuasion: a 
central route where people consider a message based on its logic and a peripheral 
route where people rely on peripheral cues (Petty & Wegener, 1999).  This view 
is also consistent with other dual process models such as the heuristic-systematic 
model where people either process more heuristically, relying on cues and using 
short-cuts or where people process more systematically (Chaiken, 1987; 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).  One of the peripheral cues that we will 
examine in this dissertation is the power of expert opinions.  A peripheral cue 
such as expertise can change people’s attitudes when they are not carefully 
examining the argument and the information presented (DeBono & Harnish, 
1988; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981).   
Persuasion has had a very long history in social psychology and we think 
that it may be more obvious why group influence and expert opinion should not 
strongly influence and change attitudes, at least not as a general rule.  It seems 
problematic that people who are processing somewhat carefully and effortful, 
have dramatically different views about the exact same welfare policy when they 
know whether their own political party supports or opposes it.  Do people really 
believe that it is in their best interest to evaluate a policy less based on its content 
and more on which political party supports it?  We argue that people would 
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disagree that it is, for example because they might know that political parties 
may have different motives and agendas that leads them to support or oppose a 
policy and they might know that such political agendas can have little to do with 
the actual content of a policy.   
Similarly, for expert opinion as a powerful peripheral cue for persuasion 
(Chaiken, 1987; Petty et al., 1981), it may seem sensible for people to not always 
rely on experts.  This may be especially true in situations where people have 
already experience with the attitude object and they really feel like they are in a 
position to evaluate the attitude object themselves instead of relying too much on 
expert opinions.   
In sum, the judgments and decisions in the areas of emotion, negative 
information, and persuasion that we have just described, have in common that 
people strongly rely on some attribute and less on other attributes:4 people can be 
strongly influenced by emotional information and not very much by objective 
information, they can be strongly influenced by negative information and less by 
other relevant information, their attitudes can be strongly influenced by group 
influence and expert opinion and less by their own attitudes and experiences.  
Notice that one claim in this dissertation is that these weightings can be very 
different from people’s beliefs about how much weight these attributes should 
                                                
4 By describing these weightings in terms of pairs of attributes where one 
strongly influences judgments and decisions and another attribute does not, we 
don’t mean to imply that these two attributes might be in some kind of 
competition or contrast where more influence of one would necessarily imply 
less influence of the other.   
15 
 
get and if people were to think about these beliefs, they would change the 
weightings.  
 
Mindless judgment and decision making   
We have argued above that these effects in the three domains of 
emotions, negative information, and persuasion, are all decision weightings that 
can be very functional and adaptive (e.g. allowing a quick response in a 
threatening situation).  These weightings appear to be “scripted” in the sense that 
people are processing emotional and negative information, group influence and 
expert opinion without being aware and mindful of how much weight this 
information actually has on their judgments and decisions (Langer, 2000).  
Importantly, these weightings are not necessarily the same as automatic or 
heuristic processing, which are often used to characterize the processing style 
that people engage in when they are not especially motivated to process very 
carefully, deeply, or systematically—an idea which is consistent with a number 
of different dual process models (Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Epstein, Lipson, 
Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Petty & 
Wegener, 1999; Pham, 2007; Sloman, 1996, 2002).  This dissertation does not 
hypothesize that mindful decision making can change processing style from 
heuristic to systematic.  Instead, we propose and examine mindful decision 
making as a processing style that makes people aware of how much various 
pieces of information influence their judgments and decisions, and this 
awareness allows people to either increase or decrease the weighting of this 
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information.  Because we argue that mindlessness is not the same as automatic or 
heuristic processing, one prediction that follows and is examined in this 
dissertation is that the effects of systematic thinking would lead to different 
weightings compared with mindful judgment and decision making.   
Even though these three effects are examining different psychological 
mechanisms in different areas, we argue that one feature that all these effects 
have in common is a strong reliance on some types of information or decision 
attributes (emotions, negative information, group influence, and expert opinion).  
This mindless reliance on information can be compared to following and 
expecting behavioral scripts mindlessly (Langer, 1992, 2000; Langer & Abelson, 
1972; Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978; Langer & Piper, 1987).  For 
behavioral scripts, people presumably have abstracted features from 
encountering a number of similar situations and they are processing behavioral 
sequences relying on those features without awareness instead of the specific 
information of the actual situation.  In one of the early studies, participants were 
approached while they were waiting to make copies at a copy machine and a 
confederate of the experimenter wanted to cut in line (Langer et al., 1978).  
Participants were given not a good reason for why the confederate wanted to cut 
in line, no information, or a good reason.  When the confederate wanted to cut in 
line to make just a few copies, more participants allowed the confederate to do 
this when the confederate gave them a good or not a good reason compared with 
no reason at all.  Interestingly, it did not matter whether the confederate said 
“May I use the xerox machine, because I have to make copies” (not a good 
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reason) or “May I use the xerox machine, because I’m in a rush” (good reason).  
A behavioral pattern such as this has been interpreted as “mindless” because one 
would expect people to differentiate between providing a good or not a good 
reason.  When participants were sufficiently motivated because the confederate 
wanted to make a lot of copies, they attended to the information and they 
differentiated between a good and not a good reason (more participants let the 
confederate cut in line when they provided a good reason compared with not a 
good reason).   
A similar perspective can be adopted for judgment and decision making.  
People rely on emotions and negative information, they allow groups to define 
the meaning of attitude objects, and they rely on peripheral cues in persuasion.  
Throughout this dissertation, we refer to these weightings as mindless judgment 
and decision making.  In sum, when people are making judgments and decisions 
mindlessly, they may be unduly influenced—according to their own beliefs 
about how decisions should be made—by information that attracts attention by 
default.  
 
Mindful decision making 
From mindless to mindful judgment and decision making.  Up until 
now, we argued that scripted judgment and decision processing that people 
engage in by default can be characterized as relatively mindless.  In a mindless 
state of judgment and decision making, people can either under- or overweight 
attributes compared with people’s prescriptive beliefs about how much weight 
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attributes should get.  As we briefly mentioned above, theoretically, people can 
also weight attributes in line with their prescriptive beliefs, which is not the focus 
of the present investigation, but could be of interest to examine other aspects of 
mindfulness in future research.  Such aspects of mindfulness may include for 
example benefits in reducing regret after learning about the negative outcome of 
a decision because it serves as a justification for the decision (Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002) or it may increase choice satisfaction as a consequence of 
thinking about the weighting of the decision attributes.  
Many of the judgments and decisions people make by default show a 
different weighting than what people’s prescriptive beliefs would imply.  We 
refer to beliefs about how much attributes should be weighted as prescriptive 
beliefs to differentiate these subjective beliefs and standards from normative 
standards, which are mostly based on external rational choice models.  The 
studies in this dissertation examine various kinds of prescriptive beliefs, their 
effects on decision attribute weightings, and whether people think they make 
better decisions when they are mindful of decision attributes.  We examined two 
different ways for inducing mindful processing, but the common idea is that we 
ask people to rate the importance of decision attributes before they make their 
judgment or decision.  We hypothesized that this would make people mindful 
and aware of the decision attributes.  Consequently, people would engage in 
changing their weighting to match their prescriptive beliefs.  
There is an interesting analogy in cognitive psychology, which are effects 
of inattentional blindness where information is presented directly in front of 
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people, but they fail to see it, because their attention is focused on other 
information (Mack, 2003).  Perhaps one of the most famous illustrations of this 
effect is where participants are watching a video clip where two groups of people 
are each playing a ball game and a majority of participants are not aware that a 
person wearing a gorilla costume is walking among two groups (Simons & 
Chabris, 1999).  People were instructed to count the number of times one of the 
groups passes the ball, which requires all their attentional resources.  While 
people are focusing their attention on the number of times one of the groups 
passes the ball, they do not see a person in a gorilla costume walking right 
through the two groups even though this person is clearly in their visual field.  
When people are asked afterwards if they noticed anything unusual, most of 
them are not aware that anything unusual happened in the video, indicating that 
people simply did not see this person.  However, if people are made aware of this 
and they see the person in a gorilla costume, they are very surprised and even 
shocked that they failed to notice this, suggesting that they believe that they 
should clearly notice events that are so unusual and unexpected (Simons, 2000).  
In the present research, people read and see information, but they are not 
attending to some attributes and they are not weighting those.  It may be the case 
that since decision attributes such as emotions attract people’s attention, people 
may fail to notice other information such as objective, numerical information and 
it is only when people are aware of these attributes that they start to weight them 
according to their prescriptive beliefs.  These two phenomena are certainly very 
different and we do not mean to imply that the very same psychological 
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processes are at play in both.  For example, in attentional blindness paradigms, 
the information that people do not see is not relevant to complete the task 
successfully whereas in the present research, we examine situations where 
people believe that the decision attributes are in fact relevant.  Additionally, 
while inattentional blindness is a phenomenon where people fail to notice a 
stimulus, the studies in the present research are focused more on the degree to 
which some attributes influence judgments and decisions.  The analogy is still 
interesting however in the sense that by default, people attend to one attribute 
and they may fail to notice other attributes, and while people are not necessarily 
shocked that they did not notice other attributes, they believe that they should 
have taken these attributes more into account.   
Defining mindful decision making. We define mindful decision making 
as a psychological state in which people are aware and observant of their 
decision processes.  By decision processes, we refer to attribute weighting 
processes such as the weighting of emotional reactions or negative information 
when making judgments and decisions.  When people are mindful, they become 
aware of the decision attributes and how much weight these attributes receive.  
Importantly, we hypothesize that this awareness of how much weight attributes 
receive by default brings people’s prescriptive beliefs about the attribute 
weightings to mind.  We believe that being aware of decision attributes and their 
relative weighting leads to a critical evaluation of whether this seems to be the 
subjectively best weighting because presumably people are motivated to make 
“good decisions” (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993).  If it is not, then people 
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subsequently change the attribute weighting to match their preferred weighting.  
(If it seems to be the subjectively best weighting, then mindfulness would not 
lead to a change in the attribute weighting.) 
The kinds of decision attributes that people can become aware of depend 
on the decision context.  For example, we examine decision attributes such as 
emotional reactions, objective information, expert opinion, personal liking, etc.  
In almost all the studies that we present, we measure the weighting of attributes 
within the context of multiple regression data analyses where we operationalize 
attributes’ weight in terms of whether they predict judgments and decisions when 
people are mindful compared to mindless.   
The similarity to Ellen Langer’s and to clinical conceptualization of 
mindfulness is that people become aware of their decision processes, that is, their 
attribute weighting (Baer, 2003; Dimidjian & Linehan, 2003; Langer, 1992), but 
we hypothesize that this kind of mindfulness also leads people to bring to mind 
prescriptive beliefs about the ideal decision processes.  Furthermore, we 
hypothesize that people compare their decision processes with their prescriptive 
beliefs and that they engage in correcting their decision processes to match their 
prescriptive beliefs.  Neither Ellen Langer’s nor clinical conceptualizations of 
mindfulness propose that mindfulness is related to such as strong evaluative 
component.  Initially however, when people become aware of their own thought 
and decision processes, mindfulness is conceptualized similarly across Ellen 
Langer’s work, clinical applications, and the present research.  In Ellen Langer’s 
work, people become aware of behavioral sequences and scripts (Langer & 
22 
 
Abelson, 1972; Langer et al., 1978) and in clinical applications, people become 
aware of their thoughts, emotions, and bodily sensations (Baer, 2003).  In the 
present research, people become aware of decision attributes and their relative 
weighting.  
 
Conscious and unconscious thinking in judgment and decision making 
Traditionally, judgment and decision making research has assumed that a 
more careful, systematic, and analytic processing is the best way to reduce some 
of the problematic aspects that judgments and decisions can have, precisely for 
the reason that one of the main purposes of this kind of processing is to correct 
for problems that arise of heuristic and shallow processing (Kahneman, 2003).5  
This perspective is based in part on the notion that people are cognitive misers 
with limited resources who are processing only a small portion of the available 
information, which can lead to erroneous judgments (Fiske, 1992; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991; Simon, 1978).  
This view of conscious thinking is related to dual process models where 
the initial type of processing is fast, automatic, effortless, and emotional (often 
referred to as system 1, tacit, intuitive, or heuristic processing) and another type 
of processing is slow, controlled, effortful, and neutral (often referred to as 
system 2, analytic, or systematic processing) (Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Epstein et 
al., 1992; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Pham, 2007; Sloman, 1996, 
2002).  Dual process models are widely used theoretical perspectives that have 
                                                
5 There are many more strategies for debiasing people’s judgments that help 
decision makers in specific situations (Fischhoff, 2002).  
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been developed in various areas such as attribution theory (Trope & Gaunt, 
1999), impression formation (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999), attitudes and 
persuasion (Petty & Wegener, 1999), and moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001).  While 
their general purpose has been shown to be useful and influential, the main 
assumption of two distinct processes has also been criticized (Kruglanski & 
Thompson, 1999; Osman, 2004).  
However, attempts to debias people by making them process more can 
also backfire.  In response to learning about the identifiable victim effect, 
participants who were forewarned about it and encouraged to avoid it decreased, 
rather than increased, the amount they donated (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 
2007).  They chose to donate less money to the identifiable victim compared 
with participants who were not made aware of this effect, but they did not 
increase their donation to the group of victims.  They donated equal amounts to 
the identifiable victim and the group of victims.  This pattern suggests that 
encouraging people to think in a more calculating way—or at least to be on 
guard against biased behavior—undermined their emotionally induced desire to 
donate and did not increase their predicted rational behavior of giving more 
money to more people. We are speculating here, but it could be possible that 
people only recognize the problematic influence of emotional reactions in this 
situation and therefore, only corrected for that and they fail to recognize the 
problem that the number of victims has not enough influence on their decision. 
Research on heuristics, unconscious thought, and snap decisions has also 
stressed the fact that this kind of processing can be very adaptive, efficient, and 
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lead to surprisingly accurate judgments and decisions (Ambady & Rosenthal, 
1992; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999; Hogarth, 2005; Olivola & Todorov, 2010).  
One of the reasons why heuristics and unconscious thought can be superior than 
conscious, analytic, and systematic though is related to the fact that too much 
thinking can be problematic for the following reason.  In situations where people 
are thinking too much without knowledge of what they should be thinking about, 
thinking and introspection can be detrimental in part because it draws people’s 
attention to information that is not relevant and in contradiction of their 
preference (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008; 
Wilson, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  In a classic study, 
people chose among a number of posters and were instructed to indicate their 
reasons for choosing a particular poster (Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, & et 
al., 1993).  They were less satisfied with their decision compared with people 
who did not think about reasons.  Presumably, this effect occurs because it is 
difficult for people to verbalize reasons for their preferences and feelings, which 
leads them to generate reasons that may or may not be accurate, but lead to 
change people’s attitude to the poster that they chose and thus, decrease their 
satisfaction with their choice.  
In sum, people are making many decisions that are not optimal based on 
normative criteria (e.g. rational choice theory).  The question which processing 
style—effortful, analytic, and conscious or heuristic and unconscious thought—
leads to better decisions has shaped the field of judgment and decision making 
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substantially.  The present research in this dissertation contributes to this debate 
by approaching this question from a very different angle: instead of focusing on 
normative criteria, we focus on people’s own evaluations and beliefs about how 
they think they should make decisions to evaluate the quality of people’s 
decisions.  Second, instead of focusing on the differentiation between analytic, 
systematic, and reason-based thinking compared with intuitive and heuristic 
thinking, we examine mindful compared with mindless decision making as a 
processing state.  We discuss in the following section how the 
mindfulness/mindlessness distinction is different from the reasoning/intuitive 
processing distinction.  
 
What makes mindfulness different from analytic and systematic thinking? 
 It is important to differentiate on a theoretical level between 
heuristic/intuitive and analytic/systematic processing on one hand and mindless 
and mindful processing on the other hand.  
One critical feature is that these two ways of describing processing are 
not the same, but we do not argue that they are orthogonal.  For example, it is 
certainly possible that mindless processing can be characterized as effortful, 
slow, controlled, and rule-governed, which are essential characteristics of the 
reasoning system (Kahneman, 2003).  Alternatively, mindless process can be 
fast, automatic, effortless, and emotional, which are essential characteristics of 
the intuitive system (Kahneman, 2003).  As noted above, we define mindless 
processing as the default processing that people engage in as a function of 
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context and situation and where they follow judgmental scripts.  In terms of 
mindful processing, one can certainly characterize it similarly as the reasoning 
system, but with the additional, critical component that mindfulness involves 
awareness of the processing and prescriptive beliefs that people use to change 
their processing if necessary.  The latter feature is actually quite important for the 
concept of mindfulness as opposed to the reasoning system because it addresses 
one of the problems why the reasoning system sometimes fails to lead to better 
decisions.  The reasoning system can make it difficult for people to correct for 
problematic judgments and decisions if people do not know how to correct for 
problematic judgments, that is, they have to recognize the problem first and then 
they have to have and apply a theory to correct for this problem (Hogarth, 2005; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  If people do not have this kind of knowledge, 
then analytic or systematic thinking about cannot improve the process.  
Additionally, people’s knowledge may not be very well calibrated and attuned to 
when erroneous and biased judgments occur (Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Wilson, 
Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002; Wilson, Gilbert, & Wheatley, 1998; Wilson, 
Houston, & Meyers, 1998).    
The central idea behind mindful judgment and decision making is the 
claim that making people aware of the attributes that influence their decision 
leads people to change the weighting of these attributes consistent with their 
beliefs about how the weighting should be done.  Thus, we hypothesize that 
people have beliefs about how they should weight attributes and that awareness 
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of these attributes leads people to be more mindful of the weighting of these 
attributes.  
People have beliefs and lay theories about how judgments and decisions 
ought to be made (Hsee, Hastie, & Chen, 2008; Hsee, Zhang, Yu, & Xi, 2003; 
Inbar & Gilovich, 2007; Weber & Lindemann, 2007).  Generally speaking, 
people prefer to make decisions based on rational considerations, which also 
encompasses making decisions based on objective and quantified attributes (lay 
rationalism, lay scientism, Hsee).  People’s lay beliefs can also be much more 
specific than that.  Inbar and Gilovich (2007) suggest that people match the 
characteristics of the decision situation to the decision process.  For example, for 
important choices with major consequences, people prefer to make these choices 
using a rational and reason-based decision strategy (as opposed to an intuitive 
process).  
The research presented in this dissertation proposes a different set of lay 
beliefs.  Instead of proposing that people have beliefs about when they should be 
processing more rationally and when they should be relying more on their 
intuition (Inbar & Gilovich, 2007), we propose that people have prescriptive 
beliefs about the importance that specific attributes should have in the decision 
making process.  Prescriptive beliefs are specific beliefs about how important 
attributes should be for a given judgment or decision and therefore, how much 
influence and weight it should have on the decision process.  We believe this is 
an original approach based on the idea that the weighting of attributes is a 
function of how much people attend to information by default and that people 
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have beliefs about whether they think that this is consistent with how much they 
think they should be weighting the attributes.6  The final section in this 
introduction present hypotheses about how it can change the attention to and the 
weighting of attributes for the three phenomena discussed above: emotional and 
negative information, and group influence and expert opinion in persuasion.   
 
Predictions 
Emotions attracts attention. We predict that mindful decision making 
would increase the weighting of—perhaps otherwise neglected—objective and 
non-emotional information.  For humanitarian aid allocations, this leads us to 
predict that information about how many people are affected by a crisis receives 
more weight when making this decision mindfully.   
Negative information attracts attention. We predict that mindful 
decision making would increase the weighting of relevant, non-negative 
information and decrease the influence of negative information. In this 
dissertation, we examine this in the context of dating decisions where people 
have two pieces of information: their feelings about someone and information 
about what their friends think of someone.  The hypothesis is that people believe 
that their feelings should be much more influential than what their friends think 
of someone.  We hypothesize that mindless decision makers rely more on what 
                                                
6 It is certainly possible that the default weighting is consistent with the beliefs 
about how the weighting should be done.  If this is the case, the weighting that 
people would be doing when they are mindful would be the same that they are 
doing by default.   
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friends think when this information is negative, but that mindful decision makers 
rely more on their own feelings, despite the negativity bias.  
Group influence and expert opinion in persuasion. We predict that 
mindful decision making would limit the impact of group influence and the 
power of expert opinion on attitudes, but at the same time, we predict that it 
would increase the influence of other information on attitudes.  In the context of 
policy evaluations, we predict that mindfulness limits group influence on 
people’s evaluation of a policy proposal, but that people’s broad attitudes 
towards the policy’s content influence their evaluation of the policy more 
strongly.  We hypothesize that mindfulness limits the influence of expert opinion 
by increasing the weighting of personal experience with the attitude object.  
 
Study Overview 
In this dissertation, we propose and examine a psychological state of 
mindful judgment and decision making.  In Chapter 2, we report two studies, in 
which participants were made mindful of decision attributes by asking them to 
rate the importance of the attributes before making a decision.  Both studies 
show that mindful decision makers weigh information differently (compared 
with a control condition) and that these weightings are more consistent with 
people’s prescriptive beliefs.  The first study focuses more the change of the 
weightings and the second study focuses more on a change in outcome.  In 
Chapter 3, we report three studies that investigate several questions regarding the 
induction and the mechanism of mindfulness:  Does mindfulness change the 
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weighting of attributes that are not specifically mentioned to participants during 
the induction of mindfulness (Study 3)?  Can mindfulness change the weighting 
of actual affective experiences (Study 4 b)?  Do the prescriptive beliefs have 
causal influence on the direction in which the judgment is corrected (Study 4 c)?  
Most importantly, two studies in Chapter 3 will address how mindfulness is 
different from effortful and systematic processing (Study 3 and Study 5).  In 
Chapter 4, we examine whether mindfulness changes the perception of decisions 
that other people have made.  Specifically, is a decision evaluated more 
favorably when it indicates a weighting consistent with people’s prescriptive 
beliefs compared with a decision where the weighting is not consistent with 
prescriptive beliefs.  This chapter will address the question whether people 
perceive decisions differently as a function of mindfulness.  Throughout the 
introduction, we emphasized that mindfulness makes people aware of the 
attributes and we measure this awareness by measuring people’s perception of 
how much attributes were weighted in decisions.  
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Chapter 2: Initial Evidence 
Humanitarian Aid Allocation I (Study 1) 
The first study examined whether making participants mindful of 
different attributes changes the weighting of these attributes in the decision 
making process according with participants’ prescriptive beliefs.  Two categories 
of attributes are of particular interest: feeling-based information and objective 
information.  These two attribute categories are of interest because they relate to 
various dual-process models (e.g., the heuristic system is assumed to respond 
more to feeling-based information, Epstein and Pacini, 1999) and because people 
often place more weight on feeling-based information by default, which can have 
problematic behavioral implications especially when feeling-based information 
is not a valid cue for a decision (Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004; Kahneman, 2003).  More specifically, in charitable giving decisions, 
people often neglect information about the scope of crises (typically 
operationalized as the number of people that are dying) and instead, their 
decisions are more strongly influenced by emotional factors (Batson, 1990).  For 
example, the identifiable victim effect shows people’s insensitivity to the scope 
of humanitarian suffering because people donate more money to a single 
identified victim compared with a group of identified (or unidentified) victims 
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Small & Loewenstein, 2003).  There is even 
some evidence that very large numbers of victims undermine emotional 
responses such that people become increasingly insensitive to increases in the 
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number of victims (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Slovic, 
2007).   
We predicted that mindful decision making makes people aware of 
attributes that influence humanitarian aid decisions: feelings that people 
experience as a reaction of learning about humanitarian crises and the objective 
scope (e.g. the number of people who are dying) of crises.  Thus, a decision 
situation was created where people were presented with two crises: one crisis had 
a higher mortality rate, but was intended to evoke less emotional reactions 
(compared with a second crisis) and a second crisis had a lower mortality rate, 
but was intended to evoke more emotional reactions (compared with the first 
crisis).  Thus, unlike in many previous studies, the scope of the humanitarian 
crises was experimentally manipulated using a within-subjects design, which 
made the information easily available and comparable for all participants (Hsee 
& Rottenstreich, 2004; Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999; Kogut & Ritov, 
2005a, 2005b).7  This procedure allowed a measurement of which information 
has a greater influence on people’s charitable giving: objective information about 
the crises’ scope (e.g. information about the mortality rates in different 
humanitarian crises) or feeling-based information (e.g. emotional reactions).  For 
this study and all others presented here, it is important to mention that we 
measure the influence of emotional reactions and objective information in the 
                                                
7 Only Experiment 2 in Kogut & Ritov, 2005b used a within-subjects design to 
manipulate the number of victims.  Participants simultaneously learned about an 
identified single victim and an identified group of seven victims, which resulted 
in equal donations to both, thus, effectively eliminating the identifiable victim 
effect.  However, participants still were not sensitive to the number of victims—
if they were, they would have donated more to the group of seven victims.   
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context of a multiple regression where we examine whether these attributes 
predict the outcome of the judgment or decision, that is, do they have any weight 
on the outcome.  The hypothesis is that mindful decision making leads 
participants to weight objective information more (the crises’ scope, 
operationalized as mortality information) compared with a control condition.  
Method.  
Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 68; 47 female, 21 male) participated in 
exchange for course credit.  Participants were told that they would receive two 
flyers, each describing the work of an organization that helps people in need.  
Participants were told that these organizations are equally effective in their 
efforts to mitigate suffering in these crises.  This was done to make sure that 
participants did not base their aid allocation decisions on interpretations of the 
organizations’ differential effectiveness.  Then, participants received two flyers 
and were told to carefully read the flyers.  One flyer presented the organization 
“Project Aid” and the work they are doing to fight Tuberculosis in Malawi where 
Tuberculosis kills 128,000 people every year.  The information about 
Tuberculosis was presented in more emotionally evocative ways, using colored 
photographs (e.g. displaying children with sad facial expressions, looking into 
the camera).  A second flyer presented the organization “Help Now” and the 
work they are doing to provide better treatment for Malaria in Ghana where 
Malaria kills 192,000 people every year.  The information about Malaria was 
presented in less emotionally evocative ways, using fewer photographs and 
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colder colors in the photographs (e.g. showing a map of malaria risk or a 
people’s houses in a village).  Thus, these two flyers intended to display 
Tuberculosis as the less deadly crisis compared with Malaria, but at the same 
time, Tuberculosis was intended to evoke stronger emotional reactions compared 
with Malaria.   
Measures of emotional reaction and mortality perception.  After 
participants read the flyers, they were asked to indicate their emotional reaction 
and perceived mortality of Malaria and Tuberculosis: “To what extent do you 
have a stronger emotional reaction toward one disease over the other?” (1 = 
Stronger emotional reaction to Malaria, 8 = Stronger emotional reaction to 
Tuberculosis) and “To what extent are more people dying of one disease 
compared with the other?” (1 = Many more people are dying of Malaria, 8 = 
Many more people are dying of Tuberculosis).   
Aid allocation.  Finally, participants were asked to imagine that they 
“decided to donate money ($125 in total) to charitable organizations […] to 
relieve suffering resulting from Malaria and Tuberculosis.”  To avoid that 
participants make an even split among the two crises, they read information 
about what each organization can do with their donation: “$100: Provide seven 
community health workers to teach mothers to recognize danger signs of major 
childhood illnesses and seek care from a trained health provider.  $50: Provide an 
orphan or vulnerable child with essential services like health, nutrition and 
psychosocial support for two years.  $25: Provide training materials for ten 
health professionals to prevent or recognize, diagnose and treat illnesses.”  
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Participants indicated how much money they would allocate to relieve suffering 
from Malaria and how much to relieve suffering from Tuberculosis.  Participants 
were reminded that the total amount had to sum up to $125.   
Mindfulness.  How mindful participants were about their allocation was 
experimentally manipulated by either asking them about their prescriptive beliefs 
before or after they decided on how to allocate the money.  Participants indicated 
their prescriptive beliefs about the importance of their emotional reaction and of 
information regarding the crises’ severity (“How much do you think should 
information about your emotional reaction toward the diseases influence your 
allocation decision?”, “How much do you think should information about how 
many people are dying of each disease influence your allocation decision?”, 1 = 
not at all; 8 = a lot).  In the control condition, participants indicated their 
prescriptive beliefs after they stated their allocations.  In the mindful condition 
(where these beliefs needed to be made salient) however, participants indicated 
their prescriptive beliefs before they stated their allocations.  
Results. 
Manipulation check.  The flyers that described the two aid organizations 
intended to display Tuberculosis as the less deadly crisis, but evoking stronger 
emotional reactions compared with Malaria.  As expected, participants reported 
that more people were dying of Malaria compared with Tuberculosis (M = 2.28, 
SD = 1.02), which is significantly lower than the midpoint (4.5) of the scale and 
consistent with the intention to present Malaria as the more deadly crisis, t(67) = 
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-17.95, p < .001.  Perception of mortality did not differ as a function of whether 
participants were in the control or in the mindful conditions, F < 1.3.  
However, participants reported having equally strong emotional reactions 
towards Tuberculosis compared with Malaria (M = 4.57, SD = 1.86), which is 
not significantly different from the midpoint (4.5) of the scale, t < 1, ns.  Thus, 
the manipulation of how emotionally evocative the crises were presented did not 
change participants’ emotional reactions.  Even though participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions and emotional reactions were measured before 
the mindfulness manipulation, there was a marginally significant difference in 
participants’ emotional reactions such that participants in the control condition 
tended to have stronger emotional reactions to Malaria (M = 4.80, SD = 2.10) 
compared with the mindful condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.49), F(1,66) = 3.01, p = 
.087, ηpartial2 = .044.   
Prescriptive beliefs.  A majority of participants (67.65%) believe that 
information about how many people are dying should influence their decision 
more than emotional reactions.  A minority (10.29%) indicated that emotional 
reactions should influence their decision more than how many people are dying.  
The remaining portion (22.06%) indicated that these two are equally important.  
Thus, in line with the predictions, participants believed that emotional reactions 
toward the diseases should influence their allocation decision less (M = 5.12, SD 
= 1.71) compared with information about how many people are dying (M = 6.43, 
SD = 1.24).  A 2 (type of information: emotion, mortality) × 2 (mindful, control) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor revealed only a main effect 
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of type of information, F(1,66) = 29.90, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .312.  Importantly, 
these beliefs did not vary as a function of whether people thought about these 
beliefs before or after they decided on how to allocate monetary aid, F < 1.5, ns.  
Participants both in the control and in the mindful condition believed that 
emotional reactions should influence the allocation decision less (Mcontrol = 5.31, 
SD = 1.86 and Mmindful = 4.91, SD = 1.53) compared with information about how 
many people are dying (Mcontrol = 6.37, SD = 1.44 and Mmindful = 6.48, SD = 1.00, 
control condition, F(1,66) = 9.93, p = .002, ηpartial2 = .131; mindful condition, 
F(1,66) = 20.80, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .240).  It is important to keep this finding in 
the control condition in mind because it turns out to be in contrast to the 
weighting that participants actually place on these two pieces of information.8  
Allocation decision.  We analyzed participants’ allocation decision 
computing a difference score, subtracting the allocation to Tuberculosis from the 
allocation to Malaria such that higher numbers indicate higher allocations to 
Malaria, which was the crisis with the higher mortality rate, and zero indicates 
exactly equal allocations to both crises.  We regressed this difference score on 
mindful (+1 if mindful, -1 if control), emotional reactions (reverse scored, mean 
centered), perceived mortality (reverse scored, mean centered), and the two 
interactions mindful × emotional reactions and mindful × perceived mortality 
(see Table 1).   
 
                                                
8 Beliefs about emotional reactions and about information about how many 
people are dying were not correlated, r(68) = .11, ns. 
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Table 1. Predictors and findings for the multiple regression examining the impact 
of mindfulness, emotional reactions, perceived mortality, and its interactions 
(Mind = 1 if mindful & -1 if control; Mort = mortality perception, mean 
centered; Emot = emotional reactions, mean centered).  
 b se t(62) p-value ηpartial2  
Intercept 19.18 4.36 4.40 < .001 0.238 
Mind 2.63 4.36 0.60 .549 0.006 
Emot 11.17 2.53 4.41 < .001 0.239 
Mort 12.37 4.27 2.89 .005 0.119 
Mind * Mort 9.26 4.27 2.17 .034 0.070 
Mind * Emot -1.13 2.53 -0.45 .657 0.003 
 
This analysis revealed that, on average, participants donate more to 
Malaria than to Tuberculosis, b = 19.18, t(62) = 4.40, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .238.  
Furthermore, on average, stronger emotional reactions to Malaria (relative to 
Tuberculosis) lead to higher allocations to Malaria (relative to Tuberculosis), b = 
11.17, t(62) = 4.41, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .239.  Similarly, on average, higher 
perceived mortality leads to higher allocations, b = 12.37, t(62) = 2.89, p = .005, 
ηpartial2 = .119.  Most interestingly for the present research, there was a 
significant interaction between mindful and perceived mortality information such 
that higher perceived mortality leads to higher allocations and this slope was 
steeper in the mindful condition compared with the control condition, b = 9.26, 
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t(62) = 2.17, p = .034, ηpartial2 = .070.  There was no significant interaction 
between mindful and emotional reactions, t < |1|, ns.   
When analyzing the control group’s allocation decisions, the only 
significant predictor of allocations are emotional reactions, b = 12.30, t(62) = 
4.20, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .221 (notice that, on average, the intercept in this 
analysis is significantly higher than zero, b = 21.57, t(62) = 3.68, p < .001, 
ηpartial2 = .179; based on mean deviating perceived mortality information and 
emotional reactions based on the control condition’s means).  However, when 
analyzing the mindful participants’ allocation decisions, both emotional 
reactions, b = 10.04, t(62) = 2.43, p = .018, ηpartial2 = .087 and mortality 
information were significant predictors of allocations, b = 21.63, t(62) = 3.63, p 
= .001, ηpartial2 = .175  (notice that, on average, the intercept in this analysis is 
significantly higher than zero, b = 14.70, t(62) = 2.43, p = .018, ηpartial2 = .087; 
based on mean deviating perceived mortality information and emotional 
reactions based on the mindful condition’s means).  (See Appendix 1 for 
additional analyses examining whether the strength and direction of participants’ 
prescriptive beliefs have any direct or moderating effects on allocation decisions.  
Readers of Appendix 1 will see that prescriptive beliefs about mortality 
information predict, on average, participants allocation such that the more people 
agree that mortality information is important, the more money they allocate to 
the more deadly crisis.)  
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Figure 1. Allocation decisions in U.S. Dollars (0 indicate equal allocations to 
each crisis; positive numbers indicate higher allocations to Malaria) as a function 
of mindful and control condition and as a function of how high people perceive 
the mortality for Malaria (note that XLow Mortality = 5.70 and XHigh Mortality = 7.74 on 
an 8-point scale, M = 6.72, SD = 1.02, Median = 7.00).  Note that all participants 
except one participant correctly perceived Malaria higher on mortality compared 
with Tuberculosis). 
 
 
Discussion. In sum, these findings show that participants have strong 
beliefs about which information should influence their allocation decisions: 
emotional reactions or objective information.  Most participants believe that 
emotional reactions toward the diseases should influence their allocation 
decision less compared with information about how many people are dying (but 
notice that—in absolute terms—both of these attributes seem important to 
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participants).  Importantly, these beliefs did not change as a function of whether 
participants indicated the beliefs before or after they stated their allocation.  This 
is interesting because it highlights the inconsistency between participants’ 
decisions and their prescriptive beliefs.  Participants in the control condition who 
just made an allocation decision where they are not weighting mortality 
information, indicate that they think they should have weighed mortality 
information more.  It also shows that prescriptive beliefs are quite stable, that is, 
participants are not trying to appear more consistent in their beliefs (by changing 
the prescriptive beliefs to match the decision) than they actually are.   
This initial study shows that making people mindful about prescriptive 
beliefs changes their decisions such that their decisions reflect these beliefs 
better.  Consequently, participants who were mindful weigh information about 
how many people are dying more strongly when making allocations—
presumably because they think their allocation should reflect this information 
more strongly.   
One could argue that the reason why participants weigh information more 
in line with their prescriptive beliefs lies in the fact that participants strive to 
reduce cognitive dissonance and they do this by matching their actual weighting 
to their prescriptive beliefs (Festinger, 1957).  However, this can only be part of 
the underlying explanation because participants in the control condition are 
exhibiting inconsistent judgments (they don’t change their prescriptive beliefs to 
match their actual weightings).  We believe that mindfulness makes people more 
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aware of this inconsistency, which leads to reducing the inconsistency by 
changing the weighting of the decision attributes.  
As intended, the flyers about the two crises made one crisis (Malaria) 
seem more severe in terms of how many people are dying compared with the 
other crisis (Tuberculosis).  However, the manipulation check for emotional 
reactions did not show that the operationalization of emotionality was effective, 
that is, participants did not report having stronger emotional reactions for 
Tuberculosis.  One explanation for this is that emotional reactions are evoked by 
a variety of variables such as pictures, description of the crises, but also by the 
severity of the crises.  Tuberculosis might have triggered emotional reactions 
mostly because of the vivid pictures in the flyer, but Malaria might have 
triggered a similar emotional reaction, but mostly because it was the more severe 
crisis where clearly more people died.  This also helps explain the lack of a 
significant interaction of emotional reactions by mindful condition.  Believing 
that emotional reactions should (or should not) influence one’s allocation 
decision might not translate as easily into weighting this information more 
strongly because there are many other factors (like a crisis’ severity) that 
influence emotional reactions and those factors might make it justified to 
continue to weigh emotional reactions in the allocation decision—even when 
mindful.  The present study design could not differentiate among the different 
aspects that influence people’s emotional reactions and thus, subsequent changes 
in weighting of these different aspects of emotional reactions were not observed.   
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Finally, one could have expected that the direction and strength of 
prescriptive beliefs influenced how much (and in which direction) participants 
change the weighting of the mortality perception.  As Appendix 1 shows, we 
only find support for the fact that the more people agree that mortality 
information is important for this decision, the more money people allocate to the 
more deadly crisis.  We do not find any support for the hypothesis that the 
crucial interaction between mindfulness and mortality information depends on 
the direction or the strength of the beliefs.  We believe that there are two reasons 
that explain this lack of a (not predicted) three-way interaction.  First, it is 
important to keep in mind that we designed all the paradigms and experimental 
materials with the goal that the majority of participants held the same beliefs.  
Thus, we primarily intended to examine any main effects of mindfulness or 
interactions between mindfulness and decision attributes.  Measuring 
prescriptive beliefs was mostly meant to serve as a manipulation check to make 
sure people’s beliefs matched our hypothesis.  Second, there is a statistical power 
problem where the variance on measures of prescriptive beliefs was 
(intentionally) limited, which contributes to low statistical power for detecting a 
moderating effect of prescriptive belief’s content.  As a reader, one might have 
also had the impression that it seemed fairly obvious to find such clear majorities 
in terms of people’s prescriptive beliefs, which was exactly what we intended.  
Just as the reader might have felt that it is obvious which information should 
influence one’s judgment and decision, it might have been just as obvious for the 
participants in these studies.  Yet, participants in the control condition still failed 
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to judge and decide according to these “obvious” beliefs.  Part of this 
phenomenon is that despite the obviousness of how information should get 
weighted, people often fail to do so because they are typically not aware of the 
decision attributes and their influence on decision making.  However, when 
mindful, people are in a state where they are aware of and attend to this 
information and they are able to make an informed decision about the weighting 
of this information.  In the General Discussion, we will return to this issue of 
whether beliefs have a direct influence on judgments and decisions or whether 
they moderate any effects of mindfulness on judgments and decisions.   
 
Dating Decision (Study 2) 
One important goal for Study 2 is to show that mindful decision making 
can also translate into judgments and decisions where people rely more on 
feeling-based information as opposed to objective information.  In line with the 
theoretical framework presented in the introduction, the content of prescriptive 
beliefs is different depending on the decision context.  In the context of 
humanitarian aid allocation, a majority of the participants believes that they 
should rely more on objective information, in the context of choosing a person 
for a date, a majority might believe that one’s feelings should strongly influence 
the decision process.  This aspect of the theoretical framework is important to 
highlight because it differentiates mindful decision making from interventions 
that increase more effortful and systematic (and thus, relying less on affect) 
information processing in comparison to heuristic processing.  Mindful decision 
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making however is characterized by awareness of prescriptive beliefs about the 
decision process, which can lead to increasing the weighting of objective 
information (as in Study 1), but which can also lead to increasing the weighting 
of feeling-based information.  The content of people’s prescriptive beliefs differs 
depending on the decision context and thus, when people are mindful of these 
beliefs, the weighting of information changes to match these prescriptive beliefs.  
The second goal was to show that mindfulness can change the decision 
outcomes.  Study 1 showed that the weighting of objective information changes, 
but it is also important to show that as a consequence of weighting information 
differently, participants’ preferences change.  
This study presented participants with two short descriptions of people 
who they consider taking out on a date.  Participants were asked to imagine that 
they had stronger feelings for one person (compared with the other person), but 
that their friends approve less of this person (compared with the other person).  
The prediction is that mindful participants (compared with the control condition) 
will prefer to go out with the person that they have stronger feelings about—
presumably to bring their preference in line with their prescriptive beliefs about 
what should influence a dating decision more: personal liking (feeling-based 
information) or friends’ approval (external, objective information).  Participants 
in the control condition on the other hand might be overly influenced by the 
negative evaluation of one’s friends.   
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Method.  
Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 56; 41 female, 12 male, 3 participants 
failed to indicate their gender) participated in exchange for course credit.  
Participants were asked to imagine that “there are two students here at the 
University of Colorado who are both interested in going out on a date with you.”  
They are further asked to imagine that they “decided to go out on a date this 
Friday night” and that they have to choose with whom they would go out on a 
date.  Participants were told about one person (Person A) that “All of your 
friends really like this person and they immediately became extremely fond of 
this person” (high friends’ approval) and “You also like hanging out with 
him/her and you look forward to seeing him/her again” (moderate liking).  About 
another person (Person B), participants were told that “When your friends met 
this person, a lot of them did not really warm up to him/her” (low friends’ 
approval) and “You enjoy hanging out with this person a lot and every time you 
are not spending time with him/her, you catch yourself thinking about him/her” 
(high liking).  The rest of the description was intended to be similar in valence 
and attractiveness of the person (see Appendix 2 for a full description).   
The reasoning behind these two descriptions was that Person A would be 
preferred in the control condition (in part because there is no negative 
information about this person unlike for Person B’s description where one’s 
friends clearly don’t like this person), but when participants were mindful, they 
would prefer Person B because their own (hypothetical) feelings for this person 
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are stronger compared with Person A and this information about one’s own 
liking is believed to be more important than friends’ approval.     
To be sure that there was nothing in the description of these two people 
that would be confounded with the independent variable (high friends’ approval 
paired with moderate liking, low friends’ approval paired with high liking), there 
was a second version where the same descriptions were used and only the critical 
information about friends’ approval and liking was exchanged (see Appendix 2).  
Dating decision. After reading this information, participants indicate with 
whom they want to go out on a date this Friday night (1 = strongly prefer to go 
out with Person A; 6 = strongly prefer to go out with Person B).  This constitutes 
our main dependent variable of interest.   
Mindfulness. Just as in Study 1, the mindfulness manipulation is 
operationalized by asking participants to indicate their prescriptive beliefs either 
before or after they made a decision.  Participants were made mindful of their 
dating decision by indicating their prescriptive beliefs about the importance of 
their emotional reactions and their friends’ approval before they decided whom 
they choose for a date (“My own liking of each person should strongly influence 
my decision with whom to go out on a date.”, “How much my friends like each 
person should strongly influence my decision with whom to go out on a date.  1 
= strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree).  In the control condition, participants 
indicated their prescriptive beliefs after they made their dating decision.  
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Results.  
Prescriptive beliefs. A majority of participants (96.23%) believe that own 
liking should influence their dating decision more than how much one’s friends 
like someone.  The remaining portion (3.77%) indicated that these two are 
equally important.  Also in line with the predictions, participants believed that 
their own liking of someone should influence their dating decision more (M = 
5.79, SD = 0.45) compared with information about how much one’s friends like 
someone (M = 3.57, SD = 0.99).  A 2 (type of information: own liking, friends 
liking) × 2 (mindful, control) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor 
revealed only a main effect of type of information, F(1,51) = 218.58, p < .001, 
ηpartial2 = .811.  These beliefs did not vary as a function of whether people 
thought about these beliefs before or after they made their dating decision, F < 1, 
ns.  Participants both in the control and in the mindful condition believed that 
own liking should influence dating decisions more (Mcontrol = 5.73, SD = 0.53 and 
Mmindful = 5.85, SD = 0.36) compared with information about how much one’s 
friends like someone (Mcontrol = 3.50, SD = 0.99 and Mmindful = 3.63, SD = 1.01, 
control condition F(1,51) = 107.68, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .679, and mindful 
condition F(1,51) = 110.96, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .685).9  
Dating decision.  We analyzed participants’ dating decision computing a 
variable where higher numbers reflect choosing whichever person one feels more 
strongly about.  Participants in the mindful condition chose someone they felt 
more strongly (M = 3.93, SD = 1.54) about compared with participants in the 
                                                
9 Beliefs about own liking and information about friends’ approval were not 
correlated, r(53) = .01, ns. 
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control condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.67; t(54) = -2.15, p = .036).  (See Appendix 
3 for additional analyses examining whether the strength and direction of 
participants’ prescriptive beliefs have any direct or moderating effects on dating 
decisions.  Just as we found in Study 1, these additional analyses reveal a direct 
influence of prescriptive beliefs about how much information about one’s friends 
and how much they like someone.  The more participants believed that their 
friends’ approval is important, the more they chose to date whomever their 
friends liked more.  Again, we return to this issue in the General Discussion.) 
Discussion. This study is conceptually consistent with the findings from 
Study 1, but it extends the findings from Study 1 in two ways.  First, unlike 
humanitarian aid allocations, romantic partner choice is a domain where people 
believe their own feelings should have a strong influence (compared with what 
one’s friends think about one’s romantic partners).  Thus, while this study 
conceptually replicates the findings from Study 1 in a different domain, it also 
addresses the possibility that mindful decision is similar to processing 
information in valuation by calculation mode where they would rely more on fact 
based information such as objective information about the mortality rates of 
humanitarian crises (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004).  
Second, both studies show that people have in fact strong beliefs about 
which information should influence their decision more and both studies show 
two ways of how these beliefs can influence decision making.  In Study 1, 
making people mindful of these beliefs leads to an increased weighting of 
mortality information.  In Study 2 however, making people mindful of their 
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beliefs leads to different preferences (that is, which person participants choose 
for a date), which reflect these beliefs as they choose whichever person they have 
stronger feelings about.   
51 
 
Chapter 3: Boundary and Mechanism Evidence  
Global Warming Policy Agreement (Study 3) 
The purpose of Study 3 is to examine whether mindfulness can limit the 
impact of group influence on attitude change.  If mindfulness about one’s 
judgment and decision processes allows participants to become aware of what 
factors influence their judgments and decisions and to make a conscious decision 
about how much weight they want to place on these factors (based on their 
prescriptive beliefs), then one would also expect that mindfulness can limit group 
influence in a persuasion paradigm.   
This is an extension of the previous two studies in two ways.  First, one 
goal for Study 3 is to show that mindfulness can decrease the influence of one 
type of information, but that—at the same time—it can also increase the 
influence of another type of information (Study 1 only showed an increase in 
using mortality information, but it did not show a decrease in using emotional 
information).  Second, based on past research, it seems quite clear that 
participants underestimate the impact of group influence on attitude change 
(Cohen, 2003).  That is, participants in past studies indicated that they think their 
attitudes are based on facts (and not on group influence), despite the fact that 
their attitude change in the study suggested the opposite.  Thus, it is interesting to 
test the effects of mindfulness in a paradigm where people are clearly very 
biased in their self perception and very unaware of this biased perception.  This 
is interesting because this bias suggests that people would like to see their 
attitudes not being affected by group influence and instead they would like to see 
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their attitudes being based on facts.  Study 3 examines whether being mindful of 
these influences changes the relative weight that these influences—groups vs. 
facts—have on people’s attitudes and it examines whether being mindful of these 
influences can help people to overcome group influence.  
In this study, participants read a summary of a “cap and trade” policy to 
address global warming (see Appendix 4).  The policy was strongly supported, 
depending on random assignment, by either a majority of Democrats or 
Republicans.  Consistent with previous research, it was expected that participants 
in the control condition would evaluate the policy primarily along partisan lines 
with relatively little influence of their personal attitudes toward the global 
warming crisis (the “party over policy” effect, Cohen, 2003).  In the mindful 
condition, participants were first asked to reflect on how they thought policies 
should be evaluated, and specifically, to rate how much they thought policies 
should be evaluated based on partisan considerations (such as which political 
group supports the policy) versus people’s personal attitudes toward policy-
relevant issues.  It was expected that once participants were mindful of these two 
sources of influence, they would decrease the impact of group influence and 
increase the impact of their attitudes towards the policy.  
Method. 
 Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 190) participated in exchange for course 
credit.  They were told that this was a study about Global Warming Opinions.  
First, they were asked to indicate their political affiliation on two questions: “Use 
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the following political labels to describe yourself:” (1 = Liberal, 7 = 
Conservative; 1 = Democrat, 7 = Republican, both were highly correlated, r = 
.70 and thus, averaged into a Republican/Conservative score, M = 3.41, SD = 
1.41).  After that, participants read a global warming proposal, which was a cap 
and trade program (see Appendix 4).  A cap and trade policy involves a limit on 
how much pollutants can be emitted and requires firms to buy permits allowing 
the emission of pollutants.  This posits a regulation approach that goes against a 
conservative ideology and in the U.S., cap and trade programs are typically 
proposed and supported by Democrats.  Participants were either told that “65% 
of the Democrats and 30% of the Republicans” or that “65% of the Republicans 
and 30% of the Democrats” in the House of Representatives agreed with this 
proposal and a third group of participants did not receive any information at all 
about which majority supports this proposal.  After that, participants were asked 
to indicate their agreement with the proposal (How much do you agree with the 
policy proposal? 1 = not at all, 7 = very much).   
Finally, participants’ global warming attitudes were measured with 16 
questions addressed to measure the importance of global warming as a problem 
for today’s world (see Appendix 5).  This is a scale that was developed recently 
to measure people’s concern about global warming, capturing people’s thoughts, 
behaviors, intentions, and emotional reactions.  The internal reliability of the 
scale was good (Cronbach’s alpha = .74; a factor analysis suggests a single-
factor solution where this factor explains 43.69% of the variance with 16 items, 
eigenvalue = 6.99, a scree plot also supported a single-factor solution).  
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Participants’ global warming attitudes are correlated with political affiliation 
(r(187) = -.51, p < .001).   
Mindfulness. Importantly, how mindful people were of their policy 
agreement was experimentally manipulated by either asking them questions 
about their prescriptive beliefs before they indicated their policy agreement.  One 
question asked them about the importance of the content of a policy for their own 
policy agreement (“How much do you think the content of a policy should 
influence your position on a policy proposal, regardless of the position of your 
political party? 1 = very little; 7 = very much).  The second question asked them 
about the importance of their political party’s position for their own policy 
agreement (“How much do you think the position of your political party should 
influence your position on a policy proposal, regardless of the content of the 
proposal?  1 = very little; 7 = very much).  Again, in the mindful condition where 
participants needed to be made aware of these beliefs, participants answered 
these questions just before they indicated their policy agreement.  In the control 
condition, participants answered these questions at the end of the study.   
Results. 
 Prescriptive beliefs. A majority of participants (81.05%) believed that 
content should influence their own policy agreement more than political party 
support.  A minority (7.37%) believed that political party support should 
influence their policy agreement more than content of the policy and the 
remaining proportion (11.58%) believed that these two pieces of information are 
equally important.  Also in line with the predictions, participants believed that 
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content of the policy should influence their policy agreement more (M = 5.73, 
SD = 1.29) compared with political party information (M = 2.73, SD = 1.49).  A 
2 (type of information: content, political party) × 2 (mindful, control) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the first factor revealed only a main effect of type of 
information, F(1,188) = 326.59, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .635.  Importantly, these 
beliefs did not vary as a function of whether people thought about these beliefs 
before or after they indicated their policy agreement, F < 1, ns.  Participants both 
in the control and in the mindful condition believed that content of a policy 
should influence their policy agreement more (Mcontrol = 5.91, SD = 1.13 and 
Mmindful = 5.54, SD = 1.43) compared with political party information (Mcontrol = 
2.80, SD = 1.56 and Mmindful = 2.66, SD = 1.41; control condition, Fcontrol(1,188) = 
178.02, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .486; mindful condition, Fmindful(1,188) = 149.35, p < 
.001, ηpartial2 = .443.10 
 Policy agreement. Two sets of analyses were performed to examine 
whether group influence or content of the policy affects people’s agreement with 
the policy.  The first set of analyses examined whether group influence (i.e. the 
party over policy effect, Cohen, 2003) affects people’s agreement with the policy 
depending on whether participants were mindful or not.  A second set of analyses 
examined whether the content of the policy affects people’s agreement with the 
policy depending on whether participants were mindful or not.   
Impact of group influence on policy agreement.  Remember that the 
prediction is that when participants are mindful, there should be no effect of 
                                                
10 Beliefs about the content of a policy and about political party information were 
negatively correlated, r(190) = -.35, p < .001. 
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party over policy because people’s prescriptive beliefs are such that information 
about political party support should matter less for their own agreement 
compared with the content of the policy.  In fact, in a multiple regression where 
policy agreement was regressed on predictors listed in Table 4 (contrast codes) 
and Table 5 (the results of the multiple regression), there was an effect of 
political affiliation such that more Republican/Conservative participants were, 
the less they agreed with the policy, b = -.19, t(180) = -2.96, p = .003, ηpartial2 
=.046.  This is in line with the intention behind the policy since 
Democrats/Liberals should be more likely to agree with a cap and trade policy.  
In addition, there was a significant effect of Republican vs. Democratic majority 
such that participants agreed less with the policy when the majority party was 
Republican, b = -.22, t(180) = -2.06, p = .041, ηpartial2 =.023.  This finding could 
be due to the fact that participants typically expect Democrats to support a cap 
and trade policy and Republicans to oppose it and the fact that the support by 
political party was reversed in this condition could have made participants 
question the validity of the policy, which resulted in lower agreement with the 
policy.  Most importantly, this analysis revealed the predicted 3-way interaction, 
which was marginally significant, b = -.15, t(180) = -1.96, p = .051, ηpartial2 
=.021.   
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Table 4. Contrast codes for reference group.  
 Democratic 
majority  
Republican 
majority 
No majority 
information 
DemRep – 1   + 1 0 
PolControl – 1 – 1 + 2 
 
Table 5. Predictors and findings for the multiple regression examining the impact 
of group influence on policy agreement (PA = political affiliation, Mind = 1 if 
mindful & -1 if control).  
 b se  t(180) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 4.94 0.09 56.68 < .001 0.947 
PA -0.19 0.06 -2.96 .003 0.046 
DemRep -0.22 0.11 -2.06 .041 0.023 
PolControl 0.02 0.06 0.27 .788 0.000 
Mind 0.09 0.09 1.03 .306 0.006 
PA * Mind -0.07 0.06 -1.14 .254 0.007 
DemRep * Mind 0.06 0.11 0.55 .583 0.002 
PA * DemRep 0.11 0.08 1.44 .151 0.011 
PA * DemRep * Mind -0.15 0.08 -1.96 .051 0.021 
 
To interpret this marginal 3-way interaction, the effects of participants’ 
political affiliation and majority information were examined separately for the 
mindful and the control condition (see Figure 2).  As predicted, in the control 
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condition, there is a party over policy effect such that participants agree more 
with the policy when the supporting party matches their own political affiliation, 
b = .27, t(91) = 2.48, p = .015, ηpartial2 =.063 and on average, there was no effect 
of participants own political affiliation, b = -.11, t(91) = -1.32, p = .192, ηpartial2 
=.019.  In contrast, there was no party over policy effect in the mindful 
condition, b = -.04, t(88) = -0.36, ns, and instead only participants’ own political 
affiliation predicted their agreement with the policy such that the more 
Republican/Conservative participants were, the less they agreed with the policy, 
b = -.26, t(88) = -2.81, p = .006, ηpartial2 =.082.  (See Appendix 6 for additional 
analyses examining whether the strength and direction of participants’ 
prescriptive beliefs have any direct or moderating effects on policy agreement 
and group influence.  These additional analyses revealed a direct influence of 
prescriptive beliefs on policy evaluation such that participants who believed that 
the content is more important also agreed more with the policy.  This could be 
due to the fact that there was no other, alternative policy and participants who 
thought that content should play a big role for their own position may have come 
to the conclusion that the policy is a feasible attempt to address this problem.  In 
addition, this relationship between beliefs and policy agreement was stronger 
when participants were mindful, which probably reflects the fact that prescriptive 
beliefs were simply more salient in the mindful condition.  In the General 
Discussion, we will address the issue that the previous studies revealed a direct 
effect of prescriptive beliefs on the decision, but that, in the present study, we 
find this effect to be strengthened when participants were mindful.) 
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Figure 2. Agreement with the global warming policy as a function of mindful 
and control condition, whether participants were led to believe that a majority of 
Republicans or Democrats supported the policy (or no information), and as a 
function of participants’ political affiliation (Democrat = 1 SD below the mean 
on political affiliation; Republican = 1 SD above the mean on political 
affiliation).   
 
 
 Impact of global warming attitudes policy agreement.  In a second set of 
analyses, policy agreement is regressed on participants’ political affiliation, 
whether participants were made mindful (+1) or not (–1), one contrast code 
contrasting the Republican majority (+1) from the Democratic majority (–1, 
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control = 0), a second orthogonal contrast contrasting any political party 
information (each coded as –1) from the control condition (+1), participants’ 
global warming attitudes, and most importantly, the interaction between global 
warming attitudes and the mindful condition (see Table 7).  This analysis 
revealed three significant effects.  First, as reported above, when the supporting 
political party was the Republican party, participants agreed less with the policy, 
b = -.25, t(180) = -2.35, p = .020, ηpartial2 =.030.  Second, the more participants 
see global warming as a problem (indicated as scoring higher on the global 
warming scale), the more they agree with the policy, b = .63, t(180) = 3.97, p < 
.001, ηpartial2 =.081.  Third, there is marginally significant support that the latter 
effect is accentuated when participants were mindful, b = .23, t(180) = 1.66, p = 
.099, ηpartial2 =.015.  Specifically, when only looking at the control condition and 
policy agreement is regressed on political affiliation, the two contrast codes 
indicating which party supports the policy, and global warming attitudes, global 
warming attitudes are marginally predicting participants’ policy agreement, b = 
.39, t(90) = 1.67, p = .099, ηpartial2 =.030.  The same analysis in the mindful 
condition reveals that global warming attitudes significantly predict policy 
agreement, b = .97, t(87) = 4.04, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.158.   
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Table 7. Predictors and findings for the multiple regression examining the impact 
of policy’s content on policy agreement (PA = political affiliation, Mind = 1 if 
mindful & -1 if control, GW = mean centered global warming attitudes).  
 b se t(180) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 4.95 0.08 58.60 < .001 0.950 
DemRep -0.25 0.11 -2.35 .020 0.030 
PolControl -0.01 0.06 -0.09 .928 0.000 
PA -0.04 0.07 -0.56 .576 0.002 
Mind 0.10 0.09 1.14 .256 0.007 
GW 0.63 0.16 3.97 < .001 0.081 
Mind * GW 0.23 0.14 1.66 .099 0.015 
 
This is consistent with the analysis in the mindful condition reported 
earlier (see Figure 2, mindful condition) where there was no party over policy 
effect and only participants’ own political affiliation predicted their agreement 
with the policy, b = -.26, t(88) = -2.81, p = .006, ηpartial2 =.082.  Here, in the 
mindful condition, participants’ global warming attitudes predict policy 
agreement (and global warming attitudes and political affiliation are correlated as 
reported above, r(187) = -.51, p < .001).  (See Appendix 7 for additional analyses 
examining whether the strength and direction of participants’ prescriptive beliefs 
have any direct or moderating effects on policy agreement and global warming 
attitudes.  As reported above, analyses reported in Appendix 7 show that 
prescriptive beliefs directly predict policy evaluations, and they also interact with 
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the mindful condition such that the relationship between prescriptive beliefs and 
policy evaluation is stronger when participants are made mindful.  In addition, 
there is a marginal significant three-way interaction indicating that attitudes 
toward global warming predict policy evaluations when mindful, but that this is 
only the case for people who believe that the content of a policy is more 
important compared with the position of one’s political party.  Again, we will 
return to discuss these findings in a more comprehensive way in the General 
Discussion.) 
Discussion. In the control condition, participants’ policy evaluations 
were biased by group influence (i.e. information about which political party 
supports the policy).  In contrast, attitudes about global warming and how much 
of a problem it is for today’s world had marginally significant influence on 
participants’ policy evaluation.  However, a majority of participants held the 
belief that policies should be evaluated based on personal attitudes toward 
policy-relevant issues more than on partisan considerations—an opinion that did 
not vary as a function of whether people evaluated the policy before or after they 
reported how they thought policies should be evaluated.  This belief is also 
consistent with the biased self perception reported in Cohen (2003) where 
participants indicated that they thought they were not affected by group 
influence, but more by the content of a policy.  In sum, participants in the control 
condition evaluated the policy in a way that is inconsistent with their beliefs 
about how they should evaluate policies: their evaluations were affected more by 
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group influence and less by their attitudes towards the content of the policy, but a 
majority clearly believes that it should be the opposite.   
When participants were made mindful, their policy evaluations were not 
affected by group influence (i.e., whether Democrats or Republicans supported 
the policy) and instead, they were strongly influenced by their personal attitudes 
about global warming.  Making people mindful of how much they personally 
believe partisan politics and personal attitudes should influence policy evaluation 
thus led them to evaluate policies in a way that more closely matched their 
personal normative beliefs.  The marginally significant finding that people’s 
attitudes about global warming predicted policy evaluations more strongly when 
they were mindful (compared with the control condition) is interesting because it 
suggests evidence for the mechanism that the mindfulness induction makes 
people aware of decision attributes, which subsequently changes its weighting 
without specifically mentioning this particular attribute in the mindfulness 
induction.  While in previous studies, the mindfulness induction called specific 
attention to two decision attributes, the advantage of the present study lies in the 
fact that the mindfulness induction only mentions the importance of the “content 
of the policy” and the “position of your political party.”  An attitude about global 
warming is without a doubt an important decision attribute for evaluating a 
global warming policy and people tend to become aware of this when they are 
mindful even though the manipulation does not call explicit attention to this 
particular attribute.   
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Finally, this study also showed evidence that prescriptive beliefs directly 
influence policy evaluations and that this is even more the case when participants 
were made mindful of their prescriptive beliefs (Appendix 6 and 7).  The general 
notion in all the studies presented here is that people weigh information 
differently by default compared with when they are mindful of this information 
and how they want to use this information.  However, as we have seen in all 
three studies reported so far, prescriptive beliefs can also have a direct influence 
on decisions.  It is certainly not surprising to find that people who believe that 
mortality information is very important for donation decisions also on average, 
allocate more money to the more deadly humanitarian crisis (Study 1) or that 
people who believe that their friends’ opinion is very important prefer to date 
someone whom their friends are very fond of (Study 2).  Or, as we have found in 
this study, people who believe that the content of a policy is very important also 
agree more with a feasible policy.  Only in this last study on policy evaluations 
however do we find significant evidence that prescriptive beliefs predict policy 
evaluations even more when people are mindful, that is, when they explicitly 
thought about their prescriptive beliefs.  One possible explanation is that in 
Study 1 and Study 2, people’s beliefs might have been easily available so that 
making them very explicit and salient did not change anything in terms of how 
much these beliefs affected their decision.  However, in Study 3, these beliefs 
might have been less available and they might have been not something that 
people would easily have thought of.  Thus, making them salient increased the 
effect of these beliefs on policy evaluations. .  
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Movie Preference (Study 4) 
The previous studies showed that mindful decision making can change 
the weighting of different kinds of information when participants are led to think 
about how much they should weigh these different kinds of information in the 
decision they are about to make.  The study on global warming policy 
evaluations showed a marginally significant finding that it is not necessary to 
make people aware of attributes by explicitly mentioning them in the 
mindfulness induction.  A central goal for Study 4 was to test whether the 
mindfulness induction has to mention attributes in the same decision domain or 
whether it is enough to mention similar attributes in a different decision domain.  
If awareness of attributes in a different decision domain leads to awareness and a 
subsequent change in the weighting just like inducing awareness of attributes in 
the same decision domain, then this would provide support for an “incidental” 
induction of mindfulness.  
Furthermore, this study is designed to create extended periods of liking 
(or disliking) experiences in a lab setting.  This is worth mentioning as an 
important feature of the experimental design because it is much more difficult to 
change the influence (i.e., the weighting) of real feelings compared with 
hypothetical experiences (as in Study 2).   
Study 4 a reports findings from a pretest on the stimulus materials.  In 
Study 4 b, participants first watched movie previews, after which they were 
presented with information about these movies from a film critic website.  At the 
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end, participants indicated how much they would like to watch the entire movie.  
The information from the film critic website contradicted participants’ 
experience during the preview.  For example, participants may have experienced 
high levels of liking during watching a movie preview, but the film critic 
information judged the movie very negatively.  The idea behind this design was 
that participants’ experience during the preview should predict the degree to 
which they were interested in watching the entire movie and that this relationship 
was weakened by providing contradicting information from film critics.  Most 
importantly, it was expected that the relationship between participants’ 
experience during the preview and how much they were interested in watching 
the entire movie would be stronger when participants were made mindful 
(regardless of whether mindfulness was induced incidentally or not) compared to 
a control condition.   
Movie Preview Pretest (Study 4 a). Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 25; 16 female, 9 male) participated in 
exchange for course credit.  They watched 8 movie previews in one of ten 
randomly ordered sequences.  After they watched the first preview, they 
indicated their liking and enjoyment of the preview (“How much did you like 
this preview?”, “How much did you enjoy watching this preview?” 1 = not very 
much, 9 = a lot).  Participants also indicated how much they would like to watch 
the movie (“How much does this preview make you want to watch the entire 
movie?”, “How much would you like to watch the entire movie?”; 1 = not very 
67 
 
much, 9 = a lot).  After that, participants were given information about the 
movies from a movie review website.   
“The movie review website rottentomatoes.com provides reviews and 
summarizes critiques of movies.  Most of these critiques are based on movie 
experts and movie critics working at news magazines or newspapers such as the 
New York Times.  Rottentomatoes.com summarizes all available movie reviews 
in a tomatometer.  The tomatometer measures the percentage of positive reviews 
from approved critics.  The higher the percentage, the more positive reviews (out 
of all the reviews) a movie received.  In addition, you are able to read a few short 
quotes or the entire review from critics about the movie.  Notice that all of the 
critics’ reviews are based on the entire movie while you have only seen a very 
short preview here.”   
 
Then, participants received information about the movie (see Figure 3 for 
an example).  While this information was still displayed on the screen, 
participants were asked “How much would you like to watch the entire movie?” 
(1 = not very much, 10 = a lot).  The purpose of the pretest was to select movie 
previews that were relatively similar in terms of content, length, and 
presentational style.  In addition, the purpose of the pretest was to select movie 
previews where providing film critic information significantly changed people’s 
watching preferences.  Therefore, the following analyses compare participants’ 
reactions and watching preferences before they received film critic information 
with watching preferences after they received film critic information.   
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Figure 3. Example for operationalization of the film critic information.  The 
tomatometer has previously been explained to participants (in this example, there 
were 86% positive reviews from approved film critics for the movie Rachel 
Getting Married).   
 
 
To analyze these data, the ratings were transformed into z-scores (within 
each participant).  This was done because the response scale (10-point scale) for 
watching preferences after receiving film critic information differed from the 
response scales (9-point scale) that was used for the ratings before receiving film 
critic information.  Within each person, a z-score was computed for Reactions 
(averaging the liking and enjoyment questions, r = .97), for Watch Pre 
(averaging “How much does this preview make you want to watch the entire 
movie?” and “How much would you like to watch the entire movie?”, r = .97), 
and Watch Post for each of the eight movies.  Importantly, Watch Pre is a 
measure of participants’ watching preferences before they received film critic 
information and Watch Post is a measure of participants’ watching preferences 
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after they received film critic information.  For example, to compute a 
participant’s z-score for Reactions to the preview Steam, this z-score was based 
on this participant’s average (and standard deviation) Reactions to all eight 
movie previews; to compute a participant’s z-score for watching preferences 
before film critic information, Watch Pre, this z-score was based on this 
participant’s average (and standard deviation) of the Watch Pre measures to all 
eight movie previews before film critic information.   
The pretest revealed that overall, the (accurate) information provided by 
film critics is effective in changing people’s intentions and preferences to watch 
the movie (see Table 9).  Based on this pretest, Running with Scissors, Silk, and 
Rachel Getting Married were included in the main experiment.  Running with 
Scissors and Silk showed a significant decrease in watching preferences after 
receiving film critic information.  Rachel Getting Married showed a significant 
increase in watching preferences after receiving film critic information.  In 
addition, Steam was selected, but the film critic information was changed from 
14% to 66% film critic approval with the goal to increase participants’ Watch 
Post ratings.11   
Even though the pretest showed that film critic approval information 
significantly changed how much participants wanted to see the entire movie 
                                                
11 One of the goals in selecting the previews was to have an equal number of 
previews in the main study where film critic information decreases watching 
preferences and where this information increases watching preferences.  This 
served the purpose to have a sample of previews in the main study that is diverse 
in terms of initial liking and in terms of how film critic information changes 
watching preferences.  This diversity in the stimuli was an important aspect for 
the main study with regard to the external validity of the stimuli (to address 
stimulus sampling concerns).   
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based on the preview, many of these previews did not appear to be a good fit for 
other reasons.  For example, some of the previews had many interruptions 
showing its nominations at film festivals, which—in addition to participants’ 
experienced liking—presumably influenced their ratings of their reactions and 
their watching preferences.   
 
Table 9. Average z-scores for each preview on Reactions, Watch Pre, and Watch 
Post.  For example, a z-score of -0.82 for Steam means that Steam’s z-score 
(computed based on the set of eight previews for each participant) is -0.82 
standard deviations below the mean across all participants.  For each preview, t-
statistics are reported comparing Reactions with Watch Post and comparing 
Watch Pre with Watch Post.   
Movie Reactions Watch 
Pre 
Film 
Critic 
Watch 
Post 
React vs 
Watch Post 
Watch Pre 
vs. Watch 
Post 
Steam -0.82 
(0.69) 
-0.86 
(0.76) 
14% -1.09 
(0.55) 
t(24)=1.87 
p=.074 
t(24)=1.62 
p=.118 
Scissors 1.11 
(0.67) 
1.16 
(0.59) 
30% 0.67 
(0.74) 
t(24)=3.20 
p=.004 
t(24)=3.59 
p=.001 
Rachel -0.34 
(0.79) 
-0.24 
(0.73) 
86% 0.41 
(0.70) 
t(24)=-3.97 
p=.001 
t(24)=-3.78 
p=.001 
Silk 0.33 
(0.73) 
0.29 
(0.80) 
8% -0.42 
(0.98) 
t(24)=4.82 
p<.001 
t(24)=5.28 
p<.001 
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Italian -0.14 
(0.84) 
-0.06 
(0.80) 
10% -0.50 
(0.68) 
t(24)=2.65 
p=.014 
t(24)=3.98 
p=.001 
Fargo -0.50 
(0.79) 
-0.52 
(0.83) 
94% 0.28 
(0.97) 
t(24)=-4.59 
p<.001 
t(24)=-4.31 
p<.001 
Count -0.20 
(0.68) 
-0.19 
(0.63) 
95% 0.51 
(0.76) 
t(24)=-3.57 
p=.002 
t(24)=-3.81 
p=.001 
Margot 0.56 
(0.73) 
0.41 
(0.82) 
51% 0.14 
(0.56) 
t(24)=3.25 
p=.003 
t(24)=1.95 
p=.063 
 
Preview Liking and Movie Preferences (Study 4 b). 
Method.  
Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 57; 40 female, 17 male) participated in 
exchange for course credit.  Participants were told that their task in this study is 
to watch a few movie previews and answer a few questions about each movie.  
The order of the movie previews was the same across conditions (Steam, 
Running with Scissors, Rachel Getting Married, Silk).  Based on the pretest, 
Steam had a low enjoyment rating (M = -0.82, SD = 0.69) and was paired with a 
high film critic approval rating (66%, not truthfully), Running with Scissors had 
a high enjoyment rating (M = 1.11, SD = 0.67) and was paired with a low film 
critic approval rating (20%, not truthfully), Rachel Getting Married had a 
moderate enjoyment rating (M = -0.34, SD = 0.79) and was paired with a high 
film critic approval rating (86%, truthfully), and Silk had a moderate enjoyment 
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rating (M = 0.33, SD = 0.73) and was paired with a low film critic approval 
rating (8%, truthfully).   
Similar to the pretest, after participants watched the first preview, they 
indicated their reactions during the preview and their watching preferences 
before receiving film critic information (“How much did you like this preview?”, 
“How much did you enjoy watching this preview?”, “How much would you like 
to watch the entire movie?”; 1 = not very much, 9 = a lot).  After that, 
participants were given information about the movies from a movie review 
website, just as was done in the pretest (see Figure 3).  Finally, participants were 
asked “How much would you like to watch the entire movie?” (1 = not very 
much, 9 = a lot). 
Mindfulness. How mindful participants were of their watching preference 
after the film critic information was experimentally manipulated by either asking 
them to indicate their prescriptive beliefs about the importance of preview liking 
and film critic approval information before or after they indicated how much 
they would like to watch the entire movie.  Participants answered three questions 
that reminded them of their prescriptive beliefs: “My own liking of a movie 
preview should strongly influence my decision to watch the entire movie.”, 
“Information about the movies provided by film critics should strongly influence 
my decision to watch the entire movie.”  (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly 
agree), and “You might recall from your own experience that you liked a 
preview, but that the critics did not recommend watching this movie.  Or you 
might recall that you did not really like a preview that much, but the critics 
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highly recommended the movie.  In situations where your own liking of the 
preview contradicts what critics say about the movie, which is more important in 
your opinion?”  (1 = How much I liked the preview is much more important, 6 = 
Recommendations provided by film critics is much more important).12   
In the control condition, participants answer these three questions after 
they indicated their movie preference ratings.  In the mindful condition (where 
these beliefs needed to be made salient) however, participants answer these 
questions just before they indicated their movie preference ratings.   
One important goal for this study was to test whether these beliefs have 
to be activated in the same domain as the judgment or the decision itself or 
whether it is sufficient to make people mindful in a different domain (unrelated 
to their movie preference).  To do this, we asked participants to indicate 
prescriptive beliefs in a different domain.  The questions were introduced as 
being about choosing classes for next semester “What do you think is more 
important when choosing your classes for next semester, information about the 
classes provided by other students who took these classes or how much you like 
the topic of the classes?”  Participants indicated agreement with three statements: 
“My own liking of the topic of the classes should strongly influence my decision 
which classes to take next semester.”, “Information about the classes provided by 
other students who took these classes should strongly influence my decision 
                                                
12 Unlike in the previous studies, there was one question that involved a direct 
comparison of the importance of the two attributes (liking and film critic 
information).  In the previously reported studies, prescriptive beliefs about two 
attributes were often not correlated, but there may be situations that require a 
direct tradeoff of the two attributes’ importance.   
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which classes to take next semester.” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), 
and “You might recall from your own experience that you liked the topic of a 
class, but that other students who took the class did not recommend taking this 
class.  Or you might recall that you did not really like the topic of a class, but 
other students who took the class highly recommended the class.  In situations 
where your liking of the topic of a class contradicts what other students who took 
the class are saying about the class, which is more important in your opinion?” (1 
= How much I like the topic of a class is much more important; 6 = 
Recommendations provided by other students who took the class is much more 
important).  After participants indicated their agreement with all three 
statements, they were asked how much they would like to watch each of the 
movies presented in the previews.   
In sum, participants in this study had actual experiences of liking and 
enjoyment of these previews and after that, they received information that was 
somewhat inconsistent with this experience.  The prediction is that participants in 
both mindful conditions place more weight on their own experiences of liking 
when they indicate how much they would like to see the entire movie compared 
with the control condition.  It may be sufficient to think about these beliefs and 
that it doesn’t matter in which domain these beliefs are activated.  Thus, thinking 
about prescriptive beliefs in other decision domains might lead to the same 
finding as thinking about prescriptive beliefs in the current domain.  
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Results.   
Prescriptive beliefs. Analyzing the absolute ratings, a majority of 
participants (75.68%) believe that own liking should influence their movie 
preference more than film critics.  A minority (10.81%) believe that film critics 
should influence movie preferences more than own liking of the preview and the 
remaining proportion (13.51%) believe that these two pieces of information are 
equally important.  Similarly, looking at the comparative ratings, a majority 
(81.08%) indicates that own liking is more important compared with film critics 
and only a minority believed it should be the opposite way (18.92%).  Also in 
line with the predictions, participants believed that their own liking of the 
previews should influence their movie preference more (M = 4.13, SD = 0.78) 
compared with film critic information (M = 2.76, SD = 0.97).  A 2 (type of 
information: own liking, film critics) × 2 (mindful, control) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first factor revealed only a main effect of type of 
information, F(1,36) = 35.70, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .498.  Importantly, these beliefs 
did not vary as a function of whether people thought about these beliefs before or 
after they decided on how to allocate, F < 1, ns.  Participants both in the control 
and in the mindful condition believed that own liking should influence their 
movie preference more (Mcontrol = 4.22, SD = 0.55 and Mmindful = 4.05, SD = 0.95) 
compared with film critic information (Mcontrol = 2.61, SD = 0.98 and Mmindful = 
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2.90, SD = 0.97, control condition F(1,36) = 23.10, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .391, and 
mindful condition F(1,36) = 13.08, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .266.13 
Also in line with the predictions, when asked a comparative question 
participants believed that own liking is more important than film critic 
information (M = 2.26, SD = 1.22 with 3.5 indicating equal importance and 
numbers less than 3.5 indicating own liking as more important).  In a regression, 
regressing this rating (mean centered) on the control vs. mindful condition 
revealed only that the intercept was different from zero, b = -1.25, t(36) = -6.42, 
p < .001, but this did not vary as a function of condition (control = -1, mindful, 
same domain = +1), b = 0.30, t(36) = 1.55, ns.   
For the other mindful condition, analyzing the absolute ratings, a majority 
of participants (89.47%) believe that own liking should influence their class 
choices more than friends’ feedback.  The remaining proportion (10.53%) 
believe that these two pieces of information are equally important.  Similarly, 
looking at the comparative ratings, a majority (68.42%) indicates that own liking 
is more important compared with friends’ feedback and only a minority believed 
it should be the other way around (31.58%).  Also in line with the predictions, 
participants believed that their own liking should influence their class choices 
more (M = 4.89, SD = 0.32) compared with friends’ feedback (M = 3.26, SD = 
0.81, t(18) = 8.56, p < .001).14  Also in line with the predictions, when asked a 
comparative question participants believed that own liking is more important 
                                                
13 Beliefs about the importance of own liking and about film critic information 
were negatively correlated, r(38) = -.32, p = .053. 
14 Beliefs about the importance of own liking and about friends’ feedback were 
not correlated, r(19) = .12, p = .639. 
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than film critic information (M = 2.53, SD = 1.47), which is significantly 
different from the scale midpoint of 3.5, t(18) = -2.89, p = .010.   
Movie preferences. There are two different ways for analyzing these data. 
One strategy is to use a multilevel data analysis approach and to estimate 
separate slopes and intercepts for each individual participant.  A second strategy 
is to examine the relationship between participants’ reactions to the preview and 
their preferences for watching the movies—averaging across all four films—as a 
function of mindfulness (compared with the control condition).  The prediction 
for both data analysis strategies is that the slope for reactions to the preview 
should be steeper in the mindful conditions compared with the control condition, 
presumably because participants in the mindful conditions are less influenced by 
film critic information, but more by their own liking of the preview.  
First, we used a multilevel data analysis approach to examine these data.  
On the level of the individual participant, we regressed their Watch Post ratings 
on their average Reactions to the preview (“How much did you like this 
preview?”, “How much did you enjoy watching this preview?”) and we were 
subsequently and across participants interested in whether these slopes differ as a 
function of mindfulness condition.  Thus, level 1 analyses (for each participant i)  
and for each film j) and level 2 analyses were as follows:  
Level 1:  Watch Postij = α0i + α1i Reactionsij + εij 
Level 2:  α0i = β00 + β01 Control Vs. Mindfuli + β02 Mindful: same 
Vs. diff. domaini + ε0i 
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α1i = β10 + β11 Control Vs. Mindfuli + β12 Mindful: same 
Vs. diff. domaini + ε1i 
 This analysis was performed with all three sets of orthogonal contrast 
codes (see Table 14), but the slope for Reactions did not differ as a function of 
condition (control, mindful in same or different domain), t < |1.6|, ns.  The same 
analyses were performed using the film critic information as the predictor on 
level 2, but the slope for film critic information did not differ by condition, t < 
|1.5|, ns.  Interestingly however, additional analyses reported in Appendix 8 
indicate that there is evidence for a three-way interaction such that the 
relationship between preview liking and movie preference depends on 
mindfulness (Control Vs. Mindful) and prescriptive beliefs.  Specifically, for 
participants who endorse the belief that personal liking is more important than 
film critic information, both mindfulness conditions show a stronger relationship 
between preview liking and movie preference compared with the control 
condition.  For participants who endorse the opposite belief such that film critic 
information is more important than personal liking of the previews, both 
mindfulness conditions lead to a weaker relationship between preview liking and 
movie preference.   
The second data analysis strategy examines how much weight people’s 
reactions to the preview have in predicting their preference for watching the 
entire movie after they have received film critic information.  (See Appendix 9 
for additional analyses and additional information on the effect of film critic 
information on watching preferences as a function of mindfulness.)  For an 
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overview of the contrast codes used for the control condition and the mindful 
conditions, please refer to Table 14.  The most important hypotheses concerned 
the difference between the control condition and both mindfulness conditions 
(Control Vs. Mindful).  To examine these hypotheses more specifically, two 
additional sets of contrast codes were created where one contrast code tests the 
difference between the control and the same domain mindfulness condition 
(Control Vs. Mindful (same domain)) and another contrast code tests the 
difference between the control and the different domain mindfulness condition 
(Control Vs. Mindful (different domain)).  Thus, three sets of orthogonal contrast 
codes were created (see Table 14).   
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Table 14. Three sets of orthogonal contrast codes to examine differences in 
slopes between reactions and watching preferences after receiving film critic 
information.   
 Control Mindful 
(same 
domain) 
Mindful 
(different 
domain) 
Control Vs. Mindful +2 –1 –1 
Mindful: same Vs. diff. domain 0 +1 –1 
Control Vs. Mindful (same) –1 +1 0 
Control Mindful (same domain) Vs. 
Mindful (diff. domain) 
–1 –1 +2 
Control Vs. Mindful (diff. domain) –1 0 +1 
Control Mindful (diff. domain) Vs. 
Mindful (same domain) 
–1 +2 –1 
 
 
To examine whether the slopes differ significantly as a function of 
condition, Watch Post (“How much would you like to watch the entire movie?”) 
was regressed on Reactions (“How much did you like this preview?”, “How 
much did you enjoy watching this preview?”, across all conditions r = .97), 
Control Vs. Mindful, Mindful: same Vs. diff. domain, both interactions of the 
contrast codes by Reactions, controlling for Watch Pre.  Not surprisingly, Watch 
Pre predicted Watch Post, b = .60, t(50) = 3.43, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.190.  Most 
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importantly for the present hypothesis, there was a significant interaction 
between Reactions and the contrast code Control Vs. Mindful, b = -.13, t(50) = -
2.05, p = .045, ηpartial2 =.078, indicating a steeper slope between reactions and 
watching preferences when participants were made mindful (regardless of the 
domain) compared with the control condition (see Figure 4).  Interestingly, there 
is no significant interaction between Reactions and the contrast code Mindful: 
same Vs. diff. domain, b = -.03, t < 1, ns.  None of the other predictors was 
significant, ts < |1.3|, ns.   
 
Figure 4. Relationship between Reactions and Watch Post as a function of 
mindful (different or same domain) and control condition.  The regression lines 
are plotted given the range of data.   
 
 
To examine whether the slope for reactions in the control condition 
differs from the mindful (same domain) condition, the same multiple regression 
was performed, but with a different set of orthogonal contrast codes (see Table 
14, second set of contrast codes).  One code contrasted the control condition 
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from the mindful (same domain) condition, Control Vs. Mindful (same domain), 
and a second code contrasted the control condition and mindful (same domain) 
condition from the mindful (different domain) condition, Control Mindful (same 
domain) Vs. Mindful (diff. domain).  The interaction between Reactions and the 
contrast code Control Vs. Mindful (same) was marginally significant, b = .19, 
t(50) = 1.81, p = .077, ηpartial2 =.061, indicating a trend for a steeper slope 
between reactions and watching preferences when participants were made 
mindful compared with the control condition (see Figure 4).  The interaction 
between Reactions and the contrast code Control Mindful (same domain) Vs. 
Mindful (diff. domain) was not significant, t < |1.1|, ns.  
To examine whether the slope for reactions in the control condition 
differs from the mindful (different domain) condition, the same multiple 
regression was performed again, but using a different set of orthogonal contrast 
codes (see Table 14, third set of contrast codes).  One code contrasted the control 
condition from the mindful (different domain) condition, Control Vs. Mindful 
(diff. domain), and a second code contrasted the control condition and mindful 
(different domain) condition from the mindful (same domain) condition, Control 
Mindful (diff. domain) Vs. Mindful (same domain).  The interaction between 
Reactions and the contrast code Control Vs. Mindful (diff. domain) was not 
significant, b = .22, t(50) = 1.67, p = .101, ηpartial2 =.078 (see Figure 4).  The 
interaction between Reactions and the contrast code Control Mindful (diff. 
domain) Vs. Mindful (same domain) was also not significant, t < |1|, ns.  
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Finally, examining each slope separately revealed that Reactions 
significantly predict watching preferences after receiving film critic information.  
In the control condition, Reactions were a significant predictor, b = .57, t(16) = 
3.13, p = .006, ηpartial2 =.380 (see Figure 4).  In the mindful (same domain) 
condition, Reactions predicted Watch Post, b = .96, t(18) = 7.44, p < .001, 
ηpartial2 =.754.  In the mindful (different domain) condition, Reactions predicted 
Watch Post, b = 1.17, t(17) = 4.60, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.554.15    
Discussion. Both, the multilevel modeling approach and the second data 
analysis approach are valid ways for analyzing these data.  The biggest 
difference between these two is that the second data analysis approach averages 
across the four different film clips without taking into account the variation 
among the four clips.  While both analytic strategies have validity and allow us 
to draw slightly different conclusions, we want to be sure to point out that there 
is a good reason for the second data analysis approach where we averaged across 
all four trials (=films).  All four films have in common that people experience a 
reaction when they were watching the preview and these reactions toward the 
previews as a set predict people’s preference toward the movie set.  Receiving 
somewhat contradicting information from film critics diminishes this 
relationship.  Regardless of whether the film critic information increased or 
decreased people’s preferences, in all cases, it would have diminished how well 
                                                
15 A multiple regression was performed to examine the effects of prescriptive 
beliefs on watching preferences.  Prescriptive beliefs neither predicted watching 
preferences, controlling for Reactions, contrast codes, Watch Pre, and the 
interactions between Reactions and contrast codes, nor did they interact with any 
of the findings reported previously, all ts < |1.5|, ns. 
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preview reactions predict preferences (which is exactly what we find when 
comparing control with mindful conditions).   
We conclude from this study that positive reactions to a movie preview 
significantly predict how much participants would like to watch the entire 
movie—even in the presence of information from film critics that contradicts 
participants experience while previewing the movie.  However, a majority of 
participants believe that their own reactions to a movie preview are more 
important than film critics’ information when making decisions about whether to 
see the actual movie.  Compared with a control condition, participants in both 
mindful conditions put more weight on their reactions to the movie preview 
when deciding whether to watch it or not.   
Interestingly, there was no difference whether these beliefs were 
activated in the same domain, relevant to the movie decisions or in a different 
domain where participants thought about how to choose which classes to take 
next semester (based on what their friends tell them about the class or how much 
they like the topic of the class).  This suggests that a state of mindful decision 
making can be induced in a different decision situation and that this mindfulness 
carries over to the judgment and decision that people are about to make.   
Experimental Manipulation of Prescriptive Beliefs (Study 4 c). The 
goal in this study is to experimentally manipulate the content of people’s 
prescriptive beliefs.  So far, in all the decision domains, there was a majority of 
participants holding the same prescriptive belief.  Even though there was some 
variation in terms of how strong people held the belief and even though a few 
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people even had beliefs that were opposite from the predictions, the content of 
people’s beliefs was, as predicted, very similar across all participants.  Thus, 
making people mindful of these beliefs leads people to change the weighting of 
these beliefs to match their beliefs better.  This theoretical reasoning assumes 
that when making decisions mindfully, the content of these beliefs plays a causal 
role such that people’s weighting changes because people hold prescriptive 
beliefs that suggest a different weighting than what participants would be doing 
by default (in the control condition).  This is one of the reasons why in all the 
previously reported studies, it was examined whether the direction and strength 
of people’s beliefs moderates the way participants change their weighting when 
made mindful.  In fact, there was no evidence in the previously reported studies 
suggesting that the direction (or strength) of prescriptive beliefs has any effect on 
the weighting of the information (with the exception of Study 3 where there was 
a marginal interaction of mindful × global warming attitudes × prescriptive 
beliefs, see Appendix 7).  However, all paradigms have been selected and 
designed with the goal in mind to have a clear majority of participants holding 
similar beliefs.  It is therefore not surprising that there was a lack of evidence for 
the moderating role of prescriptive beliefs. 
In this study, the content of participants’ prescriptive beliefs was 
experimentally manipulated.  Participants saw previews of two movies, they 
received information from film critics and how much they recommend each 
movie, and finally, participants indicated how much they would like to watch 
each movie.  One half of participants was lead to believe that information 
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provided from film critics is more important for their movie preference 
compared with their liking of the preview.  The other half was lead to believe the 
reverse (liking of the preview is more important for movie preference compared 
with information provided from film critics).  The hypothesis is that for the latter 
group of participants who presumably believe that preview liking is more 
important than film critic information, their movie preferences will be less 
influenced by film critic information and that film critic information will affect 
movie preferences more for the former group of participants who presumably 
believe that film critic information is more important than preview liking.   
One of the challenges in manipulating participants’ prescriptive beliefs is 
to develop a manipulation that still seems to participants as if they self-generated 
the beliefs as opposed to externally provided decision rules.  Thus, participants 
were asked to think and write about why they should rely more on their own 
liking or why they should rely more on information provided by film critics 
when choosing which movie to see.   
Method.  
 Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 47; 20 female, 27 male, data collection 
ongoing) participated in exchange for course credit.  Participants were given two 
movie options to indicate their preference.  One movie (Rachel Getting Married) 
had very positive film critic information, which highly recommended the movie.  
A second movie (Silk) had very negative film critic information where only a 
very small minority of film critics recommended the movie.  Thus, the two 
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important attributes on which these movie previews vary were the degree of 
enjoyment participants experienced during the preview and the information 
provided from film critics.  The main outcome measure was participants’ 
preferences for watching the entire movie based on the preview and the film 
critic information.   
First, participants were told that they were about to watch a couple of 
movie previews and that their task is simply to watch these movie previews and 
to answer questions later on.  After participants watched the preview for Rachel 
Getting Married and Silk, they received film critic information (see Figure 3).  
For Rachel Getting Married, the film critics highly recommended this movie 
(86% positive reviews from film critics) and for Silk, the film critics strongly 
advised against this movie (8% positive reviews from film critics).  
Mindfulness. Then, participants either wrote about why it might be better 
to rely on the information provided by film critics or why it might be better to 
rely on own liking of a preview when making decisions about how much they 
want to see a movie.  Specifically, participants who were instructed to think 
about the fact that relying on film critic information might often be better than 
relying on own liking of a preview (Film Critics > Liking) read the following 
instructions:  
You might recall from your own experience that you sometimes liked a preview, 
but that the critics did not recommend watching this movie.  Or you might recall 
that you did not really like a preview that much, but the critics highly 
recommended the movie.  In situations where your own liking of the preview 
contradicts what critics say about the movie, it is often better to trust what film 
critics say about the movie.  Most of the time, how film critics rated the movie is 
a very good and reliable indicator for how much people will enjoy the movie.  
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After all, they have seen the entire movie (and not just a preview) and they know 
how good it is.  
Please describe briefly why you think that you should trust more what film 
critics say as opposed to how much you liked a preview when you decide 
whether to see a movie. 
 
Participants who were instructed to think about the fact that relying on 
own liking of a preview might often be better than relying on film critic 
information (Liking > Film Critics) read the following instructions:  
You might recall from your own experience that you sometimes liked a preview, 
but that the critics did not recommend watching this movie.  Or you might recall 
that you did not really like a preview that much, but the critics highly 
recommended the movie.  In situations where your own liking of the preview 
contradicts what critics say about the movie, it is often better to trust your own 
liking of the preview.  Most of the time, how much people liked a preview is a 
very good and reliable indicator for how much people will enjoy the actual 
movie.  After all, people have different tastes and you know best how much you 
just enjoyed the preview!  
Please describe briefly why you think that you should trust more how much you 
liked a preview as opposed to what film critics say when you decide whether to 
see a movie. 
 
Finally, participants were asked “How much would you like to watch the 
entire movie?” (1 = not very much, 9 = a lot). 
Results. Data from three participants were excluded from data analyses 
because they did not follow the instructions: all three participants were in the 
Film Critics > Liking condition, but their responses to the open ended question 
indicated that they think it is better to rely on own liking as opposed to film critic 
information.  
These ratings on watching preferences were analyzed using a 2 (Rachel, 
Silk) × 2 (Film Critics > Liking, Liking > Film Critics) ANOVA with the first 
factor as a repeated measures factor (see Figure 5).  This analysis indicated a 
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main effect of movie such that Rachel (M = 4.89, SD = 2.71) received higher 
ratings than Silk (M = 3.30, SD = 2.31, F(1,42) = 14.38, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .255.  
More importantly, there was also a marginally significant interaction, F(1,42) = 
3.80, p = .058, ηpartial2 = .083, suggesting that relying on experts increases the 
preference for Rachel (this simple effect is F < 1, ns.), but decreases it for Silk 
(this simple effects is F(1,42) = 1.92, p = .173, ηpartial2 = .044).16  
 
                                                
16 Another way to look at this interaction is to examine how strongly Rachel is 
preferred over Silk:  while Rachel is preferred over Silk in the Film Critics > 
Liking condition, F(1,42) = 16.49, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .282, this is no longer the 
case when participants were in the Liking > Film Critics condition, F(1,42) = 
1.70, p = .200, ηpartial2 = .039. 
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Figure 5. Movie preference as a function of preview (Rachel, which was 
recommended by 86% of all film critics, and Silk, which was recommended by 
8% of all film critics) and whether participants were led to believe that film critic 
information is more important for this preference rating compared with liking of 
the preview (Film Critics > Liking) or vice versa (Liking > Film Critics).  
 
 
Discussion. While Rachel received a stronger endorsement from film 
critics (86% of all critics recommended the movie) compared with Silk (only 8% 
of all critics recommended the movie) and while this difference in 
recommendation leads to an overall preference for watching Rachel over Silk, 
this preference tends to be stronger when participants were lead to believe that 
film critic information is more important than liking of the preview, but this 
effect is only marginally significant.  In fact, this preference is not significant 
when participants were led to believe that liking of the preview is more 
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important than film critic information.  That is, whichever prescriptive beliefs 
participants were lead to endorse, affected their preferences for watching these 
movies—presumably because participants weighed film critic information and 
liking of the preview differently as a function of the type of prescriptive belief 
they endorsed.   
The main goal of this study was to show that the content of prescriptive 
beliefs plays a causal role for how much and in which direction people engage in 
changing their preferences.  All participants in this study were mindful of the use 
of personal liking of a preview and information provided by film critics while 
they were thinking about their preferences for watching each of these movies.  
However, unlike in previous studies where a majority of participants had similar 
(and relatively homogeneous) prescriptive beliefs, this study manipulated the 
type of prescriptive beliefs that participants held.  The findings show that the 
content of these prescriptive beliefs causes people to change their preferences in 
the direction that is more in line with whichever prescriptive beliefs people were 
lead to hold.  
The timing of the mindfulness instruction is also noteworthy: as in 
previous studies, participants first see all the materials relevant for the decision 
and then mindfulness is induced.  This suggests that the encoded information is 
the same for all participants (in the control and in the mindful conditions), but 
that the mindfulness changes the weighting of this information in line with 
people’s prescriptive beliefs.   
 
92 
 
Humanitarian Aid Allocation II (Study 5) 
The goal of this study is to examine and address the possibility that 
mindful decision making is a process similar to effortful thinking or that it is a 
process that leads to similar outcomes as effortful thinking does.  This study used 
the context of humanitarian aid allocation, but in addition to manipulating how 
mindful participants were made about the weighting of information, their need 
for cognition was measured (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).  The 
need for cognition (NCS, see Appendix 10) can be considered as a measurement 
of analytical-rational thinking based on the cognitive-experiential self-theory 
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996).  Since the purpose of this study was 
mostly to address questions whether mindfulness makes people process more 
effortful and analytically, we were primarily interested in measuring analytical-
rational thinking using the need for cognition scale and not people’s engagement 
in heuristic and automatic processing.  If mindful decision making and 
analytical-rational thinking are working in similar ways, then one would predict 
that participants in the control condition who are high on the need for cognition 
would show similar effects compared with participants in mindful condition who 
are lower on the need for cognition.  However, if mindful decision making 
changes decision making (in comparison with a control condition) because of 
other ways—other than because of increasing the amount of deep thinking—then 
this dissociation might result in an interaction pattern.   
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Method.  
Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 57; 30 female, 27 male) participated in 
exchange for course credit.  A similar procedure was used as in the first study.  
Participants received two flyers and were told to carefully look at the flyers and 
read all the information on them.  One flyer presented the organization “Project 
Aid” and the work they are doing to fight Tuberculosis in Malawi where 
Tuberculosis kills 128,000 people every year.  This flyer about Tuberculosis 
contains six colored pictures (e.g. showing children with sad facial expressions).  
Another flyer presented the organization “Help Now” and the work they are 
doing to provide better treatment for Malaria in Ghana where Malaria kills 
192,000 people every year.  This flyer about Malaria contains four colored 
pictures (e.g. showing maps of malaria risk and houses).  Thus, these flyers 
intended to display Tuberculosis as the less deadly crisis compared with Malaria, 
but at the same time, Tuberculosis presumably evoked stronger emotional 
reactions compared with Malaria.   
Measures of emotional reaction and mortality perception.  After 
participants read the flyers, they answered two questions about their reactions 
and the mortality information of Malaria and Tuberculosis: “To what extent do 
you have a stronger emotional reaction toward one disease over the other?” (1 = 
Stronger emotional reaction to Malaria, 8 = Stronger emotional reaction to 
Tuberculosis) and “To what extent are more people dying of one disease 
94 
 
compared with the other?” (1 = Many more people are dying of Malaria, 8 = 
Many more people are dying of Tuberculosis).   
Aid allocation. Finally, participants were asked to imagine that they 
“decided to donate money ($125 in total) to charitable organizations […] to 
relieve suffering resulting from Malaria and Tuberculosis.”  The main outcome 
measure finally was the allocation decision.  Participants indicated how much 
money they allocate to relieve suffering from Malaria and how much they 
allocate to relieve suffering from Tuberculosis.  The total amount of the 
allocation had to sum up to $125.   
Mindfulness. As before, how mindful participants were about their 
allocation was experimentally manipulated by either asking them about their 
prescriptive beliefs before or after they decided on how they wanted to allocate 
the money.  Participants indicated their prescriptive beliefs about the importance 
of their emotional reaction and of information regarding the crises’ severity 
(“How much do you think should information about your emotional reaction 
toward the diseases influence your allocation decision?”, “How much do you 
think should information about how many people are dying of each disease 
influence your allocation decision?”, 1 = not at all; 8 = a lot).  In the control 
condition, participants indicated their prescriptive beliefs after they stated their 
allocations.  In the mindful condition (where these beliefs needed to be made 
salient) however, participants indicated their prescriptive beliefs right before they 
stated their allocations.  At the end of the study, participants completed the need 
for cognition scale (NCS).   
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Results. 
Need for Cognition (NCS). The items on the need for cognition (NCS) 
scale were highly correlated with each other (Cronbach’s alpha = .92, a factor 
analysis suggests a single-factor solution where this factor explains 43.63% of 
the variance, 18 items, eigenvalue = 7.85, a scree plot also supported a single-
factor solution) and were thus averaged into one composite score after properly 
reverse scoring some items (M = 3.43, SD = 0.67).  There were no differences on 
NCS as a function of mindful decision making (Mcontrol = 3.56, SD = 0.58, 
Mmindful = 3.30, SD = 0.74, F(1,55)=2.13, ns).   
Manipulation Check.  Participants reported having equally strong 
emotional reactions towards Tuberculosis compared with Malaria (M = 4.79, SD 
= 1.45), which is not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale, t(56) 
= 1.51, ns.  However, participants reported that more people were dying of 
Malaria compared with Tuberculosis (M = 2.39, SD = 1.01), which is 
significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, t(56) = -15.75, p < .001.   
These perceptions do not differ as a function of mindful decision making 
(both Fs < 1, ns) and they were not correlated with NCS (both rs < |.16|, ns) 
Prescriptive beliefs.  As in Study 1, participants (47.37%) believe that 
information about how many people are dying should influence their decision 
more than emotional reactions.  A minority (17.54%) indicated that emotional 
reactions should influence their decision more than how many people are dying.  
The remaining portion (35.09%) indicated that these two are equally important.  
Also in line with the predictions, participants believed that emotional reactions 
96 
 
toward the diseases should influence their allocation decision less (M = 5.19, SD 
= 1.62) compared with information about how many people are dying (M = 6.12, 
SD = 1.18).  A 2 (type of information: emotion, mortality) × 2 (mindful, control) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor revealed only a main effect 
of type of information, F(1,55) = 11.12, p = .002, ηpartial2 = .168.  Importantly, 
these beliefs did not vary as a function of whether people thought about these 
beliefs before or after they decided on how to allocate, F < 1, ns.  Participants 
both in the control and in the mindful (only marginal significant) condition 
believed that emotional reactions should influence the allocation decision less 
(Mcontrol = 5.07, SD = 1.82 and Mmindful = 5.33, SD = 1.39) compared with 
information about how many people are dying (Mcontrol = 6.23, SD = 1.25 and 
Mmindful = 6.00, SD = 1.10; Fcontrol(1,55) = 9.51, p = .003, ηpartial2 = .147; 
Fmindful(1,55) = 2.80, p = .100, ηpartial2 = .048.  Beliefs about mortality 
information were not correlated with participants’ beliefs about emotional 
reactions, r(57) = -.07, ns.  Importantly, these beliefs were also not correlated 
with NCS (both rs < |.22|, ns).  
Allocation decision.  We analyzed participants’ allocation decision 
computing a difference score, subtracting allocation to Tuberculosis from the 
allocation to Malaria such that higher numbers indicate higher allocations to 
Malaria.  We regressed this difference score on perceived mortality information 
(reverse scored, mean centered), mindful (+1 if mindful, -1 if control), NCS 
(mean centered), all two-way, and the three-way interaction (Table 15).  On 
average, higher scores on NCS lead to higher allocations, b = 30.86, t(49) = 2.94, 
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p = .005, ηpartial2 = .150.  In addition, there was marginally significant evidence 
for a 3-way interaction, b = -27.82, t(49) = -2.00, p = .051, ηpartial2 = .076.   
 
Table 15. Multiple regression on allocations (allocation to Malaria – allocation to 
Tuberculosis) with the following predictors (Mort = mortality perception, mean 
centered; Mind = 1 if mindful & -1 if control; NCS = Need for Cognition, mean 
centered).   
 b se t(49) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 7.58 6.41 1.18 .242 0.028 
Mort 6.55 6.98 0.94 .353 0.018 
Mind -0.49 6.41 -0.08 .939 0.000 
NCS 30.86 10.51 2.94 .005 0.150 
Mort * Mind 9.72 6.98 1.39 .170 0.038 
Mort * NCS -3.62 13.90 -0.26 .796 0.001 
Mind * NCS 6.58 10.51 0.63 .534 0.008 
Mort * Mind * NCS -27.82 13.90 -2.00 .051 0.076 
 
To examine this marginally significant 3-way interaction further, 
regression slopes are estimated for participants who scored low or high on NCS 
(-/+1 standard deviation, M = 3.43, SD = 0.67 on 5-point scale).  For participants 
who score higher than the average on NCS (+1 SD), on average, mortality 
information did not predict allocations, t < |1|, ns, which also did not depend on 
mindful decision making (compared with control), t < |1|, ns.  However, the 
98 
 
intercept was significantly higher than zero, b = 28.29, t(49) = 3.14, p = .003, 
ηpartial2 = .168, indicating higher allocations to Malaria compared with 
Tuberculosis (see the two solid lines in Figure 6).   
For participants who score lower than the average on NCS (-1 SD), on 
average, mortality information did not get any weight when allocating money to 
the two crises, t < |1|, ns, but mortality information interacted with mindfulness 
such that mindfulness increased the weighting of mortality information 
compared with the control condition, b = 28.39, t(49) = 2.07, p = .044, ηpartial2 = 
.081.  Interestingly, the intercept in this analysis was not significantly different 
from zero, b = -13.12, t < |1.3|, ns.  Specifically, for participants who score lower 
than the average NCS (-1 SD), the slope for mortality information was 
significantly positive in the mindfulness condition, b = 37.37, t(49) = 2.40, p = 
.020, ηpartial2 = .105 (95% CI [6.078, 68.653]), but it was not different from zero 
in the control condition, b = -19.42, t(49) = -0.86, p = .393, ηpartial2 = .015 (see 
the two dashed lines in Figure 6).17 18 
 
                                                
17 The only slope in Figure 6 that is significantly different from zero is black, 
dashed line for participants in the mindful condition who are lower than average 
on NCS. The two intercepts that are higher than zero have participants who are 
higher than the average NCS (control condition: b = 24.37, t(49) = 2.06, p = 
.045, ηpartial2 = .080, mindful condition: b = 32.21, t(49) = 2.37, p = .022, ηpartial2 
= .103) while all other intercepts are lower than zero, but not significantly so, ts 
< |1.3|, ns. 
18 An additional analysis examined whether the strength of participants’ 
prescriptive belief about mortality information has a direct effect on allocations 
or moderates any of the other reported findings.  There was no evidence for any 
of these effects, Fs < 2.5.  
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Figure 6. Allocation decisions (0 indicate equal allocations to each disease; 
positive numbers indicate higher allocations to Malaria) as a function of mindful 
and control condition, high and low NCS (NCSLow = 2.76 and NCSHigh = 4.11 on 
5 point scale, M = 3.43, SD = 0.67, Median = 3.61), and as a function of how 
high people perceive the mortality for Malaria (note that XLow Mortality = 5.60 and 
XHigh Mortality = 7.63 on 8-point scale, M = 6.61, SD = 1.01, Median = 7.00, also 
indicating that all participants except one perceived Malaria higher on mortality 
compared with Tuberculosis).   
 
 
Discussion. These findings show that mindful decision making has a 
different effect on participants’ allocation decisions compared with chronically 
elevated levels of cognition.  For participants who were high on NCS, mindful 
decision making had no effect on how much weight they place on perceived 
mortality information.  For participants who were low on NCS however, mindful 
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decision making increased participants’ weighting of mortality information.  
Before we interpret these findings any further, we want to be sure to address the 
fact that we did not find evidence for a two-way interaction of mortality 
information and mindfulness as we obtained in Study 1.  The samples of the two 
studies are different and it is possible that the participants in Study 1 are lower in 
their need for cognition, which would explain why we found this interaction to 
be significant in Study 1.  Another possibility is that the prescriptive beliefs 
about the weighting of emotional reaction and mortality information of 
participants in Study 1 seemed slightly stronger compared with participants’ 
beliefs in Study 5.  This may have created a situation in Study 1 that made it 
easier for the mindfulness condition to have an effect on the weighting of 
mortality.   
This dissociation of the effects of NCS and mindfulness is of theoretical 
interest for two reasons.  First, it shows that mindful decision making does not 
exhibit the same outcomes in terms of weighting of mortality information and 
absolute levels of allocations as engaging in more thinking (i.e. higher need for 
cognition).  If mindful decision making and engaging in more thinking were the 
same psychological process, then one would expect participants high in NCS in 
the control condition to exhibit a similar pattern as participants low in NCS in the 
mindful condition.  This is clearly not the case and supports the argument that 
making decisions mindfully is a different psychological state compared with the 
motivation to “think more” about the decision.   
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Furthermore, this dissociation also sheds some light on how these two 
psychological constructs differ.  To examine the effects of low vs. high NCS, 
compare the two slopes in the control condition (the solid and dashed grey slopes 
in Figure 5).  These two slopes do not differ from each other, b = 24.20, t(49) = 
1.03, p = .308, ηpartial2 = .021.  And even though there is no significant effect of 
NCS, b = 24.28, t(49) = 1.64, p = .108, ηpartial2 = .052, descriptively, there is a 
trend such that higher NFC leads to higher allocations for Malaria, the more 
deadly crisis.  To examine the effects of making people mindful (compared with 
the control condition) for participants who are low in NCS, mindfulness 
increases the weighting of mortality information, b = 28.39, t(49) = 2.07, p = 
.044, ηpartial2 = .081, but there is no effect suggesting that mindfulness increases 
allocations for Malaria, the more deadly crisis, b = -4.91, t < |1|, ns.   
People who score low on the need for cognition allocate about equal 
amounts to each crisis, thus, neglecting the crises’ difference in mortality and 
their perception of the crises’ mortality.  However, by making this group of 
people mindful, they base their allocations on their perceptions of the crises’ 
mortality.  On the other hand, people who score high on the need for cognition 
allocate more money to the crisis with the higher mortality rate.  In fact, their 
allocation indicates that they donate about 72.63% of the $125 to the crisis with 
the higher mortality rate.  It is interesting to note that 60% of the total number of 
deaths happens in the crisis with the higher mortality rate.  Thus, it seems as if 
people who are high in the need for cognition might follow in their allocations 
proportionally the mortality rates—indicating a decision strategy that seems 
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quite sophisticated and probably superior from a normative perspective 
compared with basing decisions on subjective perceptions of mortality.  People 
who score high on the need for cognition may perceive such a strategy as better, 
which could explain that mindfulness does not lead them to adopt a different 
strategy where they would weight mortality perception.   
In sum, a psychological state of mindfulness increases the weighting of 
an attribute (especially for people who are not high in motivation for cognitive 
activity).  In contrast, a higher level of motivation for cognitive activity has no 
effect on the weighting of an attribute, but it has a direct effect on the decisions 
people make.  This is important for the present research because it suggests that 
making people mindful about their decisions leads them to engage in a different 
process other than simply thinking more about this decision—presumably 
mindful decision making facilitates using available information in people’s 
minds in a way that they think is more appropriate.  
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Chapter 4: Decision Evaluation – Dating Decision (Study 6) 
All the studies reported up until now show that a state of mindfulness 
leads people to “see” their own decisions in a different light, for instance so that 
they consider putting more weight on one attribute and less weight on another 
attribute.  As a result of mindful decision making, people change the weighting 
of information, because they bring to mind prescriptive beliefs of how decisions 
should be made.  Study 6 examines whether mindfulness helps people to 
perceive initial attribute weightings.  According to our theorizing about mindful 
decision making, we predict that it makes it easier for people to become aware 
and to perceive the initial attribute weightings, determine whether those 
weightings meet people’s subjective standards set in their prescriptive beliefs, 
and change the weightings so that they meet the prescriptive beliefs.  Thus, this 
study sought to examine whether mindfulness increases people’s awareness and 
perception of decision processes and specifically, attribute weightings.  
Theoretically, this is important because this perception is the precursor to 
changing the attribute weightings, which we showed in all previous studies.  In 
the previous studies, we assumed that people changed the attribute weightings 
because the default attribute weighting is inconsistent with their prescriptive 
beliefs about the attribute weighting and people correct the weighting to match 
the weighting that they believe the attributes should receive.  However, this 
theoretical reasoning presumes that people perceive their initial default 
weighting (either as meeting or not meeting their own subjective standards).   
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It is problematic to directly measure people’s perceptions of their initial 
attribute weightings for their own decisions because bringing attention and 
awareness to these weightings most likely changes and biases their perception so 
that people would think that weighting is consistent with prescriptive beliefs.19  
Therefore, in this study, we ask people for their perception of other people’s 
weightings and to subsequently evaluate the quality of these decisions.  
Participants were presented with decisions that others have made and 
they were asked to evaluate these decisions.  For a dating decision scenario, 
participants were expected to perceive more clearly whether a decision was 
influenced more by a decision maker’s own liking or by friends’ approval when 
participants were made mindful and consequently, to evaluate a decision more 
favorably when the decision reflects the decision maker’s own liking more 
compared with friends’ approval.20   
Method 
 Participants and stimulus materials. Undergraduate students at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (N = 108; 41 female, 64 male, 3 participants 
failed to indicate their gender) participated in exchange for course credit.  
Participants were told that students from the Introduction to Psychology class 
participated in a study and that they will see how these participants responded in 
this study.  Participants had full access to the instructions and materials that these 
                                                
19 This assumption is consistent with findings such as the “bias blind spot” which 
shows that people are generally motivated to see themselves as free of erroneous 
judgment (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002).   
20 This hypothesis is also based on the findings of Study 2 where there was clear 
evidence that participants’ prescriptive lay beliefs indicate that dating decisions 
should be based on own liking as opposed to friends’ approval.   
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other participants had, which were identical to the Dating Decision Study 
described earlier.  Participants saw two different patterns of responses (the order 
was counterbalanced).  One pattern indicated a participant’s preference for dating 
the person who the decision maker’s friends liked more (“Friends” pattern) and 
the other pattern indicated a participant’s preference for dating the person who 
the decision maker likes more (“Liking” pattern).  The two different decision 
patterns were operationalized by showing participants two completed 
questionnaires.  Participants were told that two different students who 
participated in this study earlier in the semester completed these questionnaires.   
After participants read the information and saw each participant’s dating 
preference, they were asked a few questions about their perceptions of this other 
person’s dating decision.  As a manipulation check, they answered “How much 
do you think this participant’s dating decision was influenced by her/his own 
liking of each person?” and “How much do you think this participant’s dating 
decision was influenced by how much her/his friends like each person?” (1 = not 
at all, 6 = very much).   
The overall perception of the quality of the decision was measured (How 
much do you agree with this participant’s dating decision? 1 = don't agree at all, 
6 = strongly agree, How would you rate the quality of this participant’s dating 
decision? 1 = very bad decision, 6 = very good decision, How carefully do you 
think thought this participant about this dating decision? 1 = not carefully at all, 
6 = very carefully).   
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In addition, they indicated an overall impression of this person (How 
likable do you think this participant is? 1 = not at all likable, 6 = very likable, 
How intelligent do you think this participant is? 1 = Not very intelligent, 6 = very 
intelligent, How competent do you think this participant is? 1 = not very 
competent, 6 = very competent, How friendly do you think this participant is? 1 = 
not very friendly, 6 = very friendly).   
Participants answered the same set of questions for two decision patterns: 
one participant’s preference for dating the person who the decision maker’s 
friends liked more (“Friends” pattern) and a second participant’s preference for 
dating the person who the decision maker likes more (“Liking” pattern) 
Mindfulness. How mindful people were about their perceptions of this 
other participant’s decision was manipulated by asking them to indicate their 
prescriptive beliefs before they indicated their perceptions about each decision 
pattern.  Specifically, participants rated the importance of own liking and the 
importance of their friends’ approval (“People’s own liking of each person 
should strongly influence their decision with whom to go out on a date.”, “How 
much people’s friends like each person should strongly influence their decision 
with whom to go out on a date.”  1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). In 
the mindful condition (where these beliefs needed to be made salient) however, 
participants indicated their prescriptive beliefs right before they rated their 
perceptions of this person’s decision.  In the control condition, participants were 
not asked to indicate their prescriptive beliefs. 
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Results 
Prescriptive Beliefs. Participants beliefs were only measured in the 
mindful condition and the previous finding was replicated that participants think 
that own liking is more much more important for these decisions compared with 
friends’ approval.  A majority (92.30%) of people in the mindful condition 
believed that own liking is more important compared with friends’ approval 
while the remaining portion thought that both information is equally important.  
A paired t-test confirmed that liking is more important (M = 5.51, SD = 0.79) 
compared with friends’ approval (M = 3.28, SD = 1.10, t(38) = 11.38, p < .001).  
Prescriptive beliefs were only measured in the mindful condition and therefore, it 
is not possible to test whether prescriptive beliefs change as a function of 
mindfulness.  Given all previous evidence however where in none of the studies 
a change in prescriptive beliefs was found (especially in Study 2 which used the 
same decision context and measured participants prescriptive beliefs in the same 
way), there is no reason to suspect that prescriptive beliefs in the mindful 
condition would be any different than prescriptive beliefs in the control 
condition.  
Decision perception. A 2 (pattern: Liking, Friends) × 2 (mindful, 
control) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor showed that people 
thought that the Liking pattern was more strongly influenced by own liking (M = 
5.03, SD = 0.93) compared with the Friends pattern (M = 3.80, SD = 1.34), 
F(1,106) = 65.04, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.380 (Figure 7).  This perception was even 
stronger when participants were mindful, F(1,106) = 4.29, p = .041, ηpartial2 
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=.039.  In the mindful condition, participants rated the Liking pattern as more 
strongly influenced by own liking compared with the Friends pattern, F(1,106) = 
40.20, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.275.  The same simple effect is also significant in the 
control condition, F(1,106) = 24.87, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.190.  This confirmed that 
participants accurately perceived these two patterns as representing one decision 
(“Liking” pattern) that is based more on own liking than the other decision 
(“Friends” pattern).  However, the perception of how much the decision is based 
on liking is accentuated when participants are mindful, which is due to a change 
in the perception of the Friends pattern when people are mindful compared with 
the control condition, F(1,106) = 4.58, p = .035, ηpartial2 =.041.  There are no 
differences in the perception of the Liking pattern when people are mindful 
compared with the control condition, F < 1, ns.  
Similarly, a 2 (pattern: Liking, Friends) × 2 (mindful, control) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the first factor showed that people thought that the 
Friends pattern was more strongly influenced by friends’ approval (M = 5.08, SD 
= 0.84) compared with the Liking pattern (M = 2.71, SD = 1.11), F(1,106) = 
314.18, p < .001, ηpartial2 =.748.  The interaction between pattern and 
mindfulness was not significant, F < 2, ns.  
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Figure 7. Participants’ agreement for each decision pattern with how much they 
were influenced by own liking and by friends’ approval as a function of whether 
they were evaluating the patterns mindfully.  The two decision patterns were one 
dating decision that was influenced by own liking (Liking pattern) and another 
dating decision that was influenced by friends’ approval (Friends pattern).   
 
 
In terms of ratings of quality, we averaged agree, quality, and careful for 
each decision pattern (Liking pattern Cronbach’s α = .71, Friends pattern 
Cronbach’s α = .76) into an overall quality index for each decision pattern.  A 2 
(pattern: Liking, Friends) × 2 (mindful, control) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the first factor showed that on average people tended to rate the Liking pattern 
of higher quality (M = 4.11, SD = 1.01) compared with the Friends pattern (M = 
3.89, SD = 0.99), F(1,106) = 3.88, p = .051, ηpartial2 =.035, which is a marginal 
significant main effect (see Figure 8).  This pattern was even stronger when 
participants were mindful, F(1,106) = 7.20, p = .008, ηpartial2 =.064.  Participants 
in the control condition did not evaluate the quality of these two patterns 
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differently: the quality of the Liking pattern (M = 3.93, SD = 1.03) was rated not 
significantly different compared with the decision maker who exhibited the 
Friends pattern (M = 4.06, SD = 0.95), F < 1, ns.  Participants in the mindful 
condition rated the Liking pattern (M = 4.43, SD = 0.92) as significantly better 
compared with the Friends pattern (M = 3.61, SD = 1.01), F(1,106) = 8.47, p = 
.004, ηpartial2 =.074.  Both patterns are evaluated differently when people were 
mindful compared with the control condition.  The Liking pattern was evaluated 
more positively, F(1,106) = 6.29, p = .014, ηpartial2 =.056 and the Friends pattern 
was evaluated more negatively, F(1,106) = 5.29, p = .023, ηpartial2 =.048.   
 
Figure 8. Quality rating of the decision as a function of whether participants 
rated the dating decision that was influenced by own liking (Liking pattern) or by 
friends’ approval (Friends pattern) and as function of mindful and control 
condition.   
 
111 
 
 
 To examine whether participants’ agreement with how much the decision 
pattern is influenced by own liking is a mediator for the difference in quality 
rating when participants were mindful, we examined a mediational analysis 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981).  First, we examined whether 
mindfulness predicts a difference in quality ratings (subtracting quality ratings 
for the friends pattern from quality ratings from the liking pattern).  Essentially, 
this replicates the repeated measures ANOVA reported in the previous 
paragraph.  The intercept in this analysis corresponds to the main effect of 
pattern, b = 0.35, t(106) = 1.97, p = .051, ηpartial2 = .035, and mindful (1 = 
mindful, -1 = control) as a predictor corresponds to the interaction of 
mindfulness × decision pattern, b = 0.47, t(106) = 2.86, p = .008, ηpartial2 = .064.   
 Second, we examined whether mindfulness predicts the mediator, 
agreement with how much the decision pattern is influenced by own liking, b = 
0.34, t(106) = 2.07, p = .041, ηpartial2 = .039.  Third, we examined whether the 
mediator affects quality ratings in a multiple regression where quality ratings are 
regressed on mindful and agreement with how much the decision pattern is 
influenced by own liking.  The mediator predicts quality ratings, controlling for 
mindfulness, b = 0.67, t(106) = 8.24, p < .001, ηpartial2 = .392.  In the very same 
multiple regression, the effect of mindfulness on quality ratings, controlling for 
the mediator, is no longer significantly different from zero, b = 0.24, t(106) = 
1.73, p = .086, ηpartial2 = .028.  A Sobel confirmed this to be a full mediation, 
t(106) = 2.02, se = 0.11, p = .044.   
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Figure 9. Mediation analysis where Mindful = 1 and Control = –1, agreement 
with how much the decision pattern is influenced by own liking for the Liking 
pattern – agreement with how much the decision pattern is influenced by own 
liking for the Friends pattern, and quality of the Liking pattern – quality of the 
Friends pattern (note that * refers to significant coefficients).   
 
 
Finally, for impression ratings, we averaged likable, intelligent, 
competent, and friendly for each pattern (Liking pattern Cronbach’s α = .77, 
Friends pattern Cronbach’s α = .84) into an overall impression index for each 
pattern.  A 2 (pattern: liking, friends) × 2 (mindful, control) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first factor showed that participants impressions of the 
patterns depended on whether they were mindful, F(1,106) = 5.65, p = .019, 
ηpartial2 =.051 (Figure 10, none of the main effects was significant, F < 1.6, ns.).  
This suggests that only when participants were mindful, their impressions of the 
decision maker who exhibited the Liking pattern were marginally more favorable 
(M = 4.41, SD = 0.70) compared with the decision maker who exhibited the 
Friends pattern (M = 4.17, SD = 0.72, F(1,106) = 3.19, p = .077, ηpartial2 =.029).  
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Participants in the control condition showed a non-significant trend in the 
opposite direction, F(1,106) = 2.50, p = .117, ηpartial2 =.023.  While the 
impression of the person exhibiting the Liking pattern did not change comparing 
the mindful with the control condition, F < 1, ns, the impression of the person 
exhibiting the Friends pattern was significantly less favorably when participants 
were mindful compared with the control condition, F(1,106) = 6.00, p = .016, 
ηpartial2 =.054.   
 
Figure 10. Impression rating of the decision maker as a function of whether 
participants rated the dating decision that was influenced by own liking (Liking 
pattern) or by friends’ approval (Friends pattern) and as function of mindful and 
control condition.   
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Discussion 
 This study showed that while participants have a clear idea about how 
other people should make decisions in the context of dating decision, by default, 
they are not evaluating decisions according to these prescriptive beliefs.  
Participants in the mindful condition (compared with the control condition) 
perceive more clearly that one dating decision reflects a stronger influence of 
own liking (as opposed to what one’s friends think) and that another dating 
decision reflects a stronger influence of what one’s friends think (as opposed to 
own liking).  The mediation analysis suggests that this difference in how people 
perceive the decision patterns leads to evaluating the two patterns differently: a 
dating decision that reflects a stronger influence of what one’s friends think is 
evaluated less favorably compared with a dating decision that reflects a stronger 
influence of own liking.  This finding strongly suggests that mindful decision 
making makes people aware of the weighting of the decision attributes and that 
people’s perception of these weightings is related to evaluations of the quality of 
a decision.  This study shows that people can perceive the attribute weightings 
and that this influences their quality judgments of decisions made by others, and 
we believe that this difference in quality ratings is one of the reasons why people 
change the attribute weightings for their own decision.  
 This finding is consistent with the theoretical reasoning that people have 
prescriptive beliefs about attribute weightings, but that they are initially not 
aware of these attributes and how much weight they receive by default.  Inducing 
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mindful processing makes people aware of these attributes and their respective 
weighting.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Overall Summary 
Judgments and decisions could often easily be changed and improved if 
people would change the weighting of attributes.  The research presented in this 
dissertation proposed and examined mindfulness as a psychological state, where 
people become aware of decision attributes and how much they weight these 
decision attributes.  Awareness of these attribute weightings brings to mind how 
these attributes should be weighted (prescriptive beliefs), which leads people to 
change the attribute weightings to match their prescriptive beliefs.  Across four 
different decision contexts, we presented evidence that mindfulness changes the 
weighting of decision attributes and the outcome of decisions.   
In Chapter 2, we described two studies that provide initial evidence that 
mindfulness changes decision making by changing the weighting of decision 
attributes.  In Study 1, mindfulness increased the weighting of objective 
information about the deadliness of a humanitarian crisis when people decided 
how much money to allocate to mitigate suffering in this crisis.  Study 2 showed 
that mindfulness changed the outcome of a dating decision such that the 
decision—and the weightings that it indicated—was more consistent with 
people’s prescriptive beliefs (that is, people relied more on their own liking of 
someone as opposed to what friends think of someone).   
In Chapter 3, we presented findings from three studies that addressed 
alternative explanations and provided some evidence for the underlying process.  
Study 3 presented evidence that mindfulness limited the impact of group 
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influence on attitudes when people were asked to evaluate a policy proposal.  
This study also presents tentative evidence (although statistically this is not 
significant) that mindfulness changes the weighting of attributes that are not even 
explicitly mentioned and pointed out to participants.  In Study 4, we showed that 
mindfulness can be induced by leading people to think about prescriptive beliefs 
in a different context.  This suggests that once a state of mindfulness is 
induced—even if this is done in a different decision context—people process 
mindfully in the current decision context.  It remains an open question to see 
whether this is still true if beliefs are activated in a context where the decision 
attributes are different or where the content of the beliefs is different from the 
prescriptive beliefs in the current decision context.  Study 4 presented also 
evidence for the causality of the content of people’s prescriptive beliefs on the 
direction in which they change the weighting of the decision attributes (Study 4).   
Study 5 addressed the issue of differentiating between mindfulness and 
analytic processing by examining the effects of individual differences regarding 
people’s motivation and chronic engagement in reasoning and cognition.  We 
addressed this issue by measuring individual differences on Need for Cognition 
(NCS), which is a scale that measures how much people are motivated to engage 
in effortful processing (Cacioppo et al., 1996).  We found a dissociation between 
NCS and mindfulness such that mindfulness increased the weighting of mortality 
(compared with a control condition) for people who scored low on NCS, but that 
people who scored higher on NCS allocated more money to the crisis with the 
higher mortality rate (which did not depend on their perception of the crises’ 
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mortality).  In other words, while mindfulness changed the weighting of 
mortality perceptions for allocation decisions, higher NCS led to higher 
allocations to the crisis with the higher mortality rate.  We argue that if 
mindfulness and high NCS were in fact the same psychological construct, we 
would have observed similar effects on the allocations and the weighting of 
mortality.   
Chapter 4 reported the findings of a study on people’s perceptions and 
evaluations of other people’s decisions and attribute weightings (Study 6).  Here, 
we found that mindfulness led to a clearer perception of the attribute weightings, 
which led to differences in evaluations of these decisions.  Thus, this study 
provided evidence for the fact that mindfulness facilitates awareness of the 
attribute weightings and that people judge the quality of a decision based on the 
attribute weightings.  
 Complementing the findings from the previous chapters, this study added 
another piece of evidence for the process by which mindfulness operates.  Two 
important aspects are worth to be highlighted.  One speaks to our hypothesis that 
mindfulness makes people more aware of the influence of decision attributes.  In 
this study, we showed that people perceived more clearly how much influence 
decision attributes have when people were mindful.  The other, related aspect is 
that mindfulness can improve decision making based on subjective standards.  
People evaluated decisions more favorably when they were consistent with their 
own prescriptive beliefs.  From the previous chapters and especially from Study 
2, we know that mindfulness changed the weighting to be more consistent with 
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prescriptive beliefs.  Taken together, this leads us to conclude that mindfulness 
improves the subjective quality of decisions.   
 
Implications 
In this section, we briefly highlight implications that this research has for 
other areas.  Specifically, we discuss how introspection on prescriptive beliefs 
relates to previous notions of introspection.  We also present a short section on 
practical implications of this work.   
Introspection. Introspection has a bad reputation in social psychology.  
This is mostly based on research done by Wilson and colleagues, whose work 
showed that introspecting and analyzing reasons can lead to negative 
consequences, such as decrease satisfaction with their choices (Wilson et al., 
1989; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  The research presented in 
this dissertation however shows that introspecting on prescriptive beliefs can 
improve decision making based on subjective standards. The critical difference is 
that introspecting on why people prefer some consumer goods over others leads 
people to generate reasons, which can contradict their initial evaluative response 
to these goods.  In other words, if people are asked to introspect on thoughts that 
they cannot know, they bring reasons to mind which may have little to do with 
their own preference, but which may even contradict their preference.  This is in 
contrast with the work presented here.  The beliefs that people are led to 
introspect are very easy to generate—in fact, these beliefs are so “obvious” to 
people that it seems trivial to even ask people to indicate them.  Mindful decision 
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making might not be helpful for people and it might not improve decision 
making if people would not have these obvious prescriptive beliefs.  Thus, we 
conclude that introspection as a psychological construct deserves to be examined 
from different perspectives without the preconceived notion that it can only be 
detrimental for people’s judgments and decisions.   
Normative decision making. An important question in judgment and 
decision making research and its applications is how we can guide or “nudge” 
people to make better decisions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  These kinds of 
questions presume that we can make informed judgments about the objective 
quality of decisions.  Can we conclude anything regarding the objective quality 
of people’s decisions based on the empirical and theoretical contribution of the 
present research?  For the studies presented here, it seems not obvious how to 
evaluate the objective quality of the decision and the weighting process.  This is 
not surprising given the fact that we were primarily interested in subjective 
notions of decision quality.  Perhaps the only paradigm in this set of studies that 
speaks to this question is the humanitarian aid allocation paradigm.  The lack of 
sensitivity for mortality rates and scope neglect more generally is considered to 
be problematic as implied by the assumption that if people were processing more 
carefully, they might not exhibit this problematic aspect of judgment and 
decision making (e.g. Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Small et al., 2007).  Our 
finding that mindfulness increases the sensitivity for mortality information 
(subjectively perceived) can be interpreted as a tentative finding where 
mindfulness might increase objective decision quality.   
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Based on our theoretical reasoning however, it is entirely possible that 
mindfulness has the potential both to increase and to decrease objective decision 
quality.  For instance, if people’s prescriptive beliefs are contrary to objective 
and normative rules for making good decisions, it seems possible that making 
people aware of attributes, that—from a normative perspective—people should 
not be aware of and that they should not take into account, might decrease 
decision quality.  It is important to stress that fact that our theoretical reasoning 
does not imply better decisions from a normative perspective, but it might still be 
a fruitful endeavor to investigate when mindful decision making could improve 
objective decision quality.  Such knowledge would certainly contribute a great 
deal to the practical implications of mindfulness as an intervention.   
Practical implication. Inducing mindfulness for judgment and decision 
making could be useful and relatively easy to implement for practical 
applications.  For example, if an organization has an interest in limiting group 
influence on policy evaluations or if charitable giving organizations have an 
interest in “nudging” people (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) into making allocations 
that are strongly influenced by objective information about the mortality of 
humanitarian crises, these organizations could provide a simple reminder that 
encourages mindful decision making.  
Such an intervention certainly requires that people have relatively 
homogeneous prescriptive beliefs, but that organizations also have knowledge 
about those beliefs.  The studies in the present research were designed such that a 
majority of the participants held the type of prescriptive belief that resonates with 
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our idea for good decision making, but also with normative claims in the 
literature about problematic aspects of decision making. Mindful decision 
making might not be suitable for decision contexts where people do not have 
stable and relatively strong beliefs about how they should weight decision 
attributes.  It might also not be suitable for decision contexts where organizations 
would not view people’s prescriptive beliefs as being in people’s or in society’s 
best interest.   
 
Remaining questions for future research 
In several sections of this dissertation, we reported analyses examining 
the effects of prescriptive beliefs either directly on the decision or by moderating 
any effects of mindfulness (e.g. on attribute weighting).  We find a direct effect 
of beliefs in the Humanitarian Aid Allocation Study (Study 1), in the Dating 
Decision Study (Study 2), and in the Global Warming Policy Agreement Study 
(Study 3).  People who believe that mortality information is very important for 
aid allocations allocate more money to the more deadly crisis (Study 1).  People 
who believe that friends’ opinions are very important for their dating decisions 
prefer to date someone that their friends are very fond of (Study 2).  Finally, 
people who believe that a policy’s content is very important for their own 
position agree more with a feasible policy to address global warming (Study 3).  
For the Movie Preference Study (Study 4), we do not find evidence for a direct 
effect of beliefs.  There is no reason to expect that beliefs about the importance 
of own liking and film critic information should be directly related to people’s 
123 
 
preference for watching any of the previews or the preview as a set.  As we 
pointed out when we discussed the Global Warming Policy Agreement Study 
(Study 3), this is the only paradigm where we find evidence for an interaction 
between mindfulness and prescriptive beliefs.  One possible explanation might 
be that in this paradigm, prescriptive beliefs might not as available as they might 
be in other paradigms and therefore, making them salient though a mindfulness 
intervention may increase their direct effect on decisions.  
In two studies, we find tentative evidence that the effect of mindfulness 
on changing the attribute weighting depends on the direction and strength of 
people’s prescriptive beliefs.  We find marginal statistical support for this in the 
Global Warming Policy Agreement Study where prescriptive beliefs moderate 
the effect of mindfulness on the relationship between global warming and policy 
support.  In the Movie Preference Study, we also find support for such a pattern 
where prescriptive beliefs moderate the effect of mindfulness on the relationship 
between preview reactions and movie preference.  At the same time, these 
patterns are absent in the Humanitarian Aid Allocation and in the Dating 
Decision Study.  We mentioned that the lack of such patterns in the 
Humanitarian Aid Allocation and in the Dating Decision Study could be due to a 
lack of variation in people’s prescriptive beliefs, which is a result of the how we 
intended to design these paradigms, namely that people should mostly endorse 
one specific type of prescriptive belief.  Based on our theoretical reasoning, the 
strength and especially the direction of people’s beliefs should play a role in how 
and how much people change the attribute weightings.  Thus, we believe that the 
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lack of these patterns in the first two studies is a consequence of low statistical 
power (due to the variance and the methodology, which was not primarily 
intended to test for these effects).  There are certainly better ways to test for these 
patterns in future research.  One would be to develop a paradigm where people’s 
prescriptive beliefs are polarized, which would maximize statistical power to 
find effects where prescriptive beliefs influence the changes in attribute 
weightings due to mindfulness differently—depending on the content of these 
beliefs.   
Another important question that we mentioned throughout this 
dissertation is how awareness of attributes and thinking of prescriptive beliefs 
would result in changing the weighting of the attributes.  We think that people 
are able to perceive their default weightings more accurately and that this allows 
them to assess more accurately whether they are meeting their own standards, set 
by their prescriptive beliefs.  We believe that people have a strong interest in 
reaching consistency between their actual weightings of the attributes and their 
prescriptive beliefs about how they should weight the attributes because 
consistency is an important self concept (Bem, 1967; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & 
Bonoma, 1971).  But what is the important psychological mechanism behind 
“mindfulness” that increases people’s awareness of the decision attributes and 
their weighting in the decision process and what leads to changing the decision 
attributes?  
One possibility is that this kind of introspective thinking acts as a signal 
that indicates to people that they are not meeting their own standards (Monteith, 
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Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001) and thus, suggests to people that their actual 
weightings are dissimilar from their prescriptive weightings (Mussweiler, 2003).  
Thus, it could be the case that people, as soon as they notice that they engage in 
introspective thinking about prescriptive beliefs, interpret this as a signal that 
their judgment might be problematic.   
This also brings up a critical next step in the theoretical and empirical 
development of this work by raising the following question.  What are the 
circumstances, decision contexts, or perhaps individual differences that lead 
people to become mindful of their decision attribute weightings by introspecting 
on their prescriptive beliefs?  In the studies presented here, we experimentally 
induce mindfulness by asking people directly about their prescriptive beliefs.  
The next question however needs to examine under which circumstances people 
engage in more or less mindful processing because these circumstances can 
potentially tell us more about the nature of this processing state.  
A related question concerns examining other ways or situations that lead 
to a state of mindfulness.  The mindfulness inductions in the present studies 
required people to indicate their prescriptive beliefs (because we were interested 
in measuring these beliefs).  It seems certainly plausible however that pointing 
out the attributes might be sufficient for engaging in thinking about the 
prescriptive weighting of these attributes.  Again, drawing the parallel to 
inattentional blindness, once someone pointed the Gorilla out to participants, it is 
impossible to ignore it in the future.  Similarly, once the decision attributes are 
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pointed out to people, it might be impossible to not think about the weighting of 
these.   
Other situational factors that lead to mindful decision making may 
include circumstances where people introspect on their thought and decision 
processes.  Notice again that this is not identical with effortful, analytical, or 
systematic processing where people tend to think more about the decision objects 
and information about the decision.  In contrast, this kind of introspection that 
may lead people into a state of mindfulness requires people to become aware of 
their own mental processes and to perceive how much they attend to certain 
types of information.  Thus, one could imagine that when people reflect and 
introspect more on their thought processes, they become mindful of how much 
they attend to certain types of information.  This kind of reasoning suggests to 
include individual difference scales on self-reflection in decision making 
paradigms such as the ones we examined here.  Further, it might be interesting to 
experimentally direct people’s focus of attention either to the decision objects 
and decision information or to people’s thought processes.  For example, we 
would predict that directing people’s attention to the decision objects and 
information about them will not change people’s weighting of the decision 
attributes to match their prescriptive beliefs as when they were made mindful.  In 
contrast, if people’s attention or mental focus is directed “inwards,” that is, to 
their thought decision processes, we predict that they will be mindful of the 
decision attributes and change their weighting to match their prescriptive beliefs 
about the weighting.   
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Closing Remarks 
 Giving people a tool that allows them to make better judgments and 
decisions according to their own standards is an important benefit that this 
research offers.  To be sure, we do not claim that mindful decision making will 
lead to better decisions based on normative standards, nor do we claim that it 
will generally lead to better decisions than heuristic or analytic decision making.  
Our claim and the evidence that we presented is that mindfulness improves the 
subjective quality of judgments and decisions by bringing people’s decisions in 
line with how people think they should to make decisions.   
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Appendix 1 
 
To examine whether the strength of participants’ prescriptive beliefs about how 
much mortality perception and how much emotional reactions should influence 
allocation decisions, the following regressions were conducted.  The analyses are 
theoretically organized in two separate multiple regressions to examine whether 
beliefs about mortality perception moderate the weighting of mortality 
perception as a function of mindfulness (Table 2).  A second analysis examined 
whether beliefs about emotional reaction moderate the weighting of emotional 
reaction as a function of mindfulness (Table 3).  As before, the dependent 
measure was a difference score, subtracting allocations to Tuberculosis (the less 
deadly crisis) from allocations to Malaria (the more deadly crisis).  Just as 
reported above, this analysis revealed a significant effect of perceived mortality, 
emotional reactions, and the interaction of mindful x perceived mortality (Table 
2 & 3).  In addition, this analysis revealed that beliefs about mortality 
information predicted allocations, such that stronger beliefs about using mortality 
perception lead to higher allocations to the more deadly crisis (Table 2 & 3).  
Beliefs about emotional reactions did not significantly predict allocations, t < 
|1.5|, ns.  Neither beliefs about mortality perception nor about emotional 
reactions interacted with any of the other predictors, all ts < |1|, ns. 
 
Table 2. Predictors and findings for the multiple regression examining the impact 
of prescriptive beliefs about how much mortality perception should influence 
allocation decisions (Mind = 1 if mindful & -1 if control; Mort = mortality 
perception, mean centered; Emot = emotional reactions, mean centered; 
BeliefMort = prescriptive beliefs about mortality perception, mean centered; 
BeliefEmot = prescriptive beliefs about emotional reaction, mean centered).   
 b se t(58) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 19.62 4.21 4.67 < .001 0.273 
Mind 2.15 4.29 0.50 .618 0.004 
Mort 12.88 4.30 3.00 .004 0.134 
Emot 12.16 2.37 5.14 < .001 0.313 
BeliefMort 8.65 3.89 2.22 .030 0.078 
BeliefEmot -3.29 2.57 -1.28 .206 0.027 
Mind * Mort 8.09 4.33 1.87 .067 0.057 
Mort * BeliefMort -1.01 4.17 -0.24 .810 0.001 
Mind * BeliefMort 0.93 3.90 0.24 .813 0.001 
Mind * Mort * BeliefMort -2.37 4.17 -0.57 .572 0.006 
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Table 3. Predictors and findings for the multiple regression examining the impact 
of prescriptive beliefs about how much emotional reactions should influence 
allocation decisions (Mind = 1 if mindful & -1 if control; Mort = mortality 
perception, mean centered; Emot = emotional reactions, mean centered; 
BeliefMort = prescriptive beliefs about mortality perception, mean centered; 
BeliefEmot = prescriptive beliefs about emotional reaction, mean centered). 
 b se t(58) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 17.56 4.35 4.04 < .001 0.219 
Mind 1.39 4.36 0.32 .751 0.002 
Mort 12.12 4.27 2.84 .006 0.122 
Emot 11.02 2.49 4.43 < .001 0.253 
BeliefMort 10.01 3.55 2.82 .007 0.121 
BeliefEmot -3.93 2.69 -1.46 .150 0.035 
Mind * Emot -2.65 2.54 -1.04 .301 0.018 
Emot * BeliefEmot -1.31 1.73 -0.76 .452 0.010 
Mind * BeliefEmot 2.48 2.65 0.93 .354 0.015 
Mind * Emot * BeliefEmot -1.74 1.77 -0.98 .330 0.016 
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Appendix 2 
Two versions of the dating descriptions, administered between-subjects.  The 
bolded sentences contain the manipulation of personal liking and friends’ 
approval.  The font was not printed in bold for participants.   
 
Version 1:  
[Person A: friends’ approval: high; personal liking: moderate 
Person B: friends’ approval: low; personal liking: high] 
 
Person A is a junior pre-law student and you have been friends with him/her for 
a few months.  He/she is friendly and very outgoing and your family thinks 
highly of this person.  He/she is in the process of applying to law schools and 
hopes to continue his/her education at a well-renowned law school to be able to 
pursue his/her goal of making partner at a prestigious law firm.  All of your 
friends really like this person and they immediately became extremely fond 
of this person.  You also like hanging out with him/her and you look 
forward to seeing him/her again.    
Person B has been a friend of yours for a few months.  He/she is a junior 
majoring in business with a minor in computer science and after graduation 
he/she will probably work at a big corporation few years.  His/her plans are to 
eventually start a business that is based on his/her interest in developing web-
based applications.  When your friends met this person, a lot of them did not 
really warm up to him/her.  You enjoy hanging out with this person a lot 
and every time you are not spending time with him/her, you catch yourself 
thinking about him/her.   
 
Version 2:  
[Person A: friends’ approval: low; personal liking: high 
Person B: friends’ approval: high; personal liking: moderate] 
 
Person A is a junior pre-law student and you have been friends with him/her for 
a few months.  He/she is friendly and very outgoing and your family thinks 
highly of this person.  He/she is in the process of applying to law schools and 
hopes to continue his/her education at a well-renowned law school to be able to 
pursue his/her goal of making partner at a prestigious law firm.  When your 
friends met this person, a lot of them did not really warm up to him/her.  
You enjoy hanging out with this person a lot and every time you are not 
spending time with him/her, you catch yourself thinking about him/her.   
Person B has been a friend of yours for a few months.  He/she is a junior 
majoring in business with a minor in computer science and after graduation 
he/she will probably work at a big corporation few years.  His/her plans are to 
eventually start a business that is based on his/her interest in developing web-
based applications.  All of your friends really like this person and they 
immediately became extremely fond of this person.  You also like hanging 
out with him/her and you look forward to seeing him/her again.    
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Appendix 3 
 
Dating decisions were regressed on mindful (+1 if mindful, -1 if control), beliefs 
that own liking should influence dating decisions, beliefs about how much one’s 
friends approve of someone, the interaction of mindful by beliefs about own 
liking, and the interaction of mindful by beliefs about friends’ approval.  This 
analysis revealed, on average, a significant effect of mindful, b = 0.49, t(47) = 
2.30, p = .026, ηpartial2 = .101.  In addition, beliefs about friends’ approval 
predicted participants’ dating preferences, b = -0.51, t(47) = -2.36, p = .023, 
ηpartial2 = .106.  Neither of the two interactions was significant: mindful × 
friends’ approval, b = -0.28, t(47) = -1.31, p = .197, ηpartial2 = .035, and mindful 
× own liking, b = -0.21, t < |1|. 
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Appendix 4 
 
The following shows the global warming policy used in Study 3.  Note that there 
were three conditions.  In one condition, 65% of the Republicans and 30% of the 
Democrats supported the proposal (Majority information: Republican).  In a 
second condition, 65% of the Democrats and 30% of the Republicans supported 
the proposal (Majority information: Democrats).  In a third condition, the two 
sentences at the beginning and at the end containing the majority information 
were omitted.   
 
 
 
Various policies have been proposed to address global warming, here is one that 
is currently discussed. We would like to get your opinion on it to see how much 
the general public would support such a policy. Currently, 65% of the 
Republicans [Democrats] and 30% of the Democrats [Republicans] in the 
House of Representatives agreed with this proposal and were willing to pass it. 
 
A private group has proposed a cap-and-trade program to combat global 
warming. The proposal draws on the power of the marketplace to reduce 
emissions in a cost-effective and flexible manner. Under the program, an overall 
cap on carbon emissions is established. The emissions allowed under the cap are 
divided up into individual allowances that represent the permission to emit that 
amount. Because the emissions cap restricts the amount of pollution allowed, 
allowances that give a company the ability to pollute take on financial value. 
Companies are free to buy and sell allowances in order to continue operating in 
the most profitable manner available to them. Those that are able to reduce 
pollution at a low cost can sell their extra allowances to companies facing high 
costs. Each year the number of allowances will decline to match the required 
annual reduction targets. In addition to this, companies with be pushed to 
gradually shift their source of energy, in all areas possible, to renewable energy. 
By shifting to renewable energy the use of fossil fuels will drastically decrease 
and therefore reduce the toxic fumes flowing into the atmosphere. 
 
When polled, 65% of the Republicans [Democrats] and 30% of the Democrats 
[Republicans] in the House of Representatives agreed with this proposal and 
were willing to pass it. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Global Warming Scale:  
 
For each of the following statements, participants were asked to check whether 
they strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly 
agree.  These five response options were shown using five different columns to 
the right of the questions.  Participants then made a check mark in one of the five 
cells.   
 
 
 
1. Global warming is already a serious problem 
2. There is a mix of opinion among scientists about whether global warming 
is a real problem 
3. Global warming is not very important to me personally 
4. Global warming is currently impacting my quality of life 
5. Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem we should not 
take any steps that would have economic costs 
6. Global warming is a serious and pressing problem.  We should take steps 
to combat global warming, even if they involve significant costs 
7. I would donate money to an organization if I believe it had an effective 
program for combating global warming 
8. Concern about global warming has influenced my use of energy (for 
example, turning off lights when I leave a room) 
9. Global warming will be a serious problem for future generations 
10. Global will cause problems for my children or grandchildren down the line 
11. Global warming is a more serious problem than global poverty 
12. Global warming is a more serious problem than HIV/AIDS 
13. Hearing about global warming makes me feel frustrated 
14. Hearing about global warming makes me feel angry 
15. Hearing about global warming makes me worry 
16. Hearing about global warming makes me feel fear 
 
142 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Finally, a regression with the following predictors was performed (see Table 6).  
As in the analysis reported above, there were effects of political affiliation, 
majority information, and the 3-way interaction between mindful, majority 
information, and political affiliation.  In addition, this analysis also revealed an 
effect of prescriptive beliefs such that the more participants believed that content 
is more important than political party information, the more they agreed with the 
policy, b = 0.09, t(178) = 2.44, p = .016, ηpartial2 = .032.  This finding is probably 
due to the fact that the policy (i) was quite reasonable and (ii) that not agreeing 
with the policy meant not addressing the problem of global warming.  Thus, if 
participants believe that the content of the policy is more important, they came to 
realize that this is a good policy based on its content (and the lack of 
alternatives), which resulted in more agreement with it.  In addition, this effect of 
beliefs was stronger in the mindful condition, b = 0.08, t(178) = 2.20, p = .029, 
ηpartial2 = .027.  Further analyses examining whether beliefs moderate the 3-way 
interaction revealed no significant findings, t < 1, ns.  
 
Table 6. Predictors and findings for the multiple regression examining the impact 
of group influence on policy agreement (PA = political affiliation, Mind = 1 if 
mindful & -1 if control, Beliefs = Prescriptive beliefs about the importance of a 
policy’s content – prescriptive beliefs about the importance of political party 
supporting the policy).  
 b se t(178) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 4.67 0.14 33.07 < .001 0.860 
DemRep -0.22 0.10 -2.15 .033 0.025 
PolControl 0.02 0.06 0.38 .708 0.001 
PA -0.18 0.06 -2.85 .005 0.044 
Mind -0.15 0.14 -1.03 .305 0.006 
Beliefs  0.09 0.04 2.44 .016 0.032 
Mind * PA -0.06 0.06 -1.03 .305 0.006 
Mind * DemRep 0.05 0.10 0.49 .624 0.001 
DemRep * PA 0.09 0.08 1.15 .254 0.007 
Mind * Beliefs 0.08 0.04 2.20 .029 0.027 
Mind * DemRep * PA -0.18 0.08 -2.28 .024 0.028 
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Finally, a regression was performed to examine the effects of prescriptive beliefs 
on policy evaluations (see Table 8).  The stronger participants believe that a 
policy’s content is more important than political party information, the more they 
agree with the policy, b = .09, t(178) = 2.50, p = .013, ηpartial2 =.034, and this was 
even more then case when participants were reminded of their prescriptive 
beliefs, b = .07, t(178) = 2.02, p = .045, ηpartial2 =.022.  There was even evidence 
for a statically marginal 3-way interaction such that the stronger relationship 
between global warming attitudes and policy attitudes when participants were 
mindful tends to be even more true the stronger participants’ beliefs are that a 
policy’s content is more important than political party information, b = .11, 
t(178) = 1.82, p = .071, ηpartial2 =.018.   
 
Table 8. Predictors and findings for two multiple regressions examining the 
impact of policy’s content on policy agreement (PA = political affiliation, Mind 
= 1 if mindful & -1 if control, Beliefs = Prescriptive beliefs about the importance 
of a policy’s content – prescriptive beliefs about the importance of political party 
supporting the policy).  
 b se t(178) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 4.68 0.14 34.30 <.001 0.869 
Mind -0.11 0.14 -0.80 .425 0.004 
DemRep -0.25 0.10 -2.45 .015 0.032 
PolControl 0.002 0.06 0.03 .979 0.000 
PA -0.03 0.07 -0.42 .672 0.001 
Beliefs 0.09 0.04 2.50 .013 0.034 
GW 0.62 0.16 3.97 < .001 0.081 
Mind * GW 0.22 0.14 1.61 .110 0.014 
Mind * Beliefs 0.07 0.04 2.02 .045 0.022 
      
 b se t(176) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 4.66 0.14 34.35 < .001 0.870 
Mind -0.09 0.14 -0.69 .493 0.003 
DemRep -0.26 0.10 -2.57 .011 0.036 
PolControl -0.003 0.06 -0.05 .958 0.000 
PA 0.002 0.07 0.03 .973 0.000 
Beliefs 0.11 0.04 2.96 .004 0.047 
GW 1.02 0.22 4.59 .001 0.107 
Beliefs * GW -0.14 0.06 -2.28 .024 0.029 
Mind * GW -0.06 0.20 -0.32 .749 0.001 
Mind * Beliefs 0.06 0.04 1.64 .103 0.015 
Mind * Beliefs * GW 0.11 0.06 1.82 .071 0.018 
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Below are additional multilevel analyses regressing Post Watch ratings on 
various predictors (see Table 14 for contrast codes, BeliefsDiff = Prescriptive 
belief that liking is more important — Prescriptive belief that film critic 
information is more important, Reactions to the previews were not mean 
deviated).  These results need to be treated with caution since convergence was 
not achieved.  The first set of analyses examines participants’ reactions to the 
preview.  The second set of analyses examines Film Critic information (Silk = 
8%, Scissors = 20%, Steam = 66%, Rachel = 86%).  
 Estimate se t p-value 
Intercept 2.77 0.68 4.07 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind -0.37 0.53 -0.69 0.492 
Mind: same Vs. diff. 0.13 0.17 0.76 0.457 
React 0.36 0.11 3.28 0.001 
BeliefsDiff -1.07 0.37 -2.90 0.004 
Control Vs. Mind * React 0.10 0.09 1.13 0.258 
Control Vs. Mind * BeliefsDiff 0.51 0.29 1.79 0.075 
React * BeliefsDiff 0.19 0.06 3.38 0.001 
Control Vs. Mind * React * BeliefsDiff -0.10 0.05 -2.29 0.023 
 Estimate se t p-value 
Intercept 2.71 0.73 3.71 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind: same 0.33 0.81 0.41 0.681 
Control Mind: same Vs. Mind: diff. -0.08 0.09 -0.83 0.414 
React 0.38 0.12 3.13 0.002 
BeliefsDiff -1.06 0.40 -2.68 0.008 
Control Vs. Mind: same * React -0.09 0.13 -0.70 0.486 
Control Vs. Mind: same * BeliefsDiff -0.52 0.43 -1.20 0.229 
React * BeliefsDiff 0.19 0.06 2.97 0.003 
Control Vs. Mind: same * React * 
BeliefsDiff 0.11 0.07 1.60 0.111 
 Estimate se t p-value 
Intercept 3.12 0.65 4.80 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind: diff 0.92 1.04 0.88 0.380 
Control Mind: diff. Vs. Mind: same 0.05 0.10 0.54 0.598 
React 0.28 0.10 2.71 0.007 
BeliefsDiff -1.28 0.35 -3.61 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind: diff * React -0.23 0.17 -1.36 0.176 
Control Vs. Mind: diff * BeliefsDiff -1.13 0.57 -1.97 0.052 
React * BeliefsDiff 0.24 0.05 4.42 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind: diff * React * 
BeliefsDiff 0.22 0.09 2.42 0.016 
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 Estimate se t p-value 
Intercept 3.69 0.49 7.48 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind -0.05 0.39 -0.12 0.907 
Mind: same Vs. diff. 0.17 0.24 0.70 0.484 
FilmCritic 0.02 0.01 2.13 0.037 
BeliefsDiff 0.74 0.26 2.86 0.006 
Control Vs. Mind * FilmCritic 0.00 0.01 0.63 0.532 
Control Vs. Mind * BeliefsDiff -0.16 0.21 -0.76 0.453 
FilmCritic * BeliefsDiff -0.01 0.00 -2.77 0.008 
Control Vs. Mind * FilmCritic * 
BeliefsDiff 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.677 
 Estimate se t p-value 
Intercept 3.76 0.53 7.07 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind: same 0.12 0.59 0.21 0.835 
Control Mind: same Vs. Mind: diff. -0.08 0.14 -0.58 0.563 
FilmCritic 0.02 0.01 1.89 0.065 
BeliefsDiff 0.70 0.28 2.49 0.016 
Control Vs. Mind: same * FilmCritic -0.01 0.01 -0.54 0.594 
Control Vs. Mind: same * BeliefsDiff 0.26 0.31 0.85 0.401 
FilmCritic * BeliefsDiff -0.01 0.01 -2.45 0.018 
Control Vs. Mind: same * FilmCritic * 
BeliefsDiff 0.00 0.01 -0.55 0.586 
 Estimate se t p-value 
Intercept 3.61 0.47 7.60 < .001 
Control Vs. Mind: diff 0.07 0.77 0.09 0.931 
Control Mind: diff. Vs. Mind: same 0.08 0.14 0.59 0.560 
FilmCritic 0.02 0.01 2.24 0.029 
BeliefsDiff 0.79 0.25 3.17 0.002 
Control Vs. Mind: diff * FilmCritic -0.01 0.01 -0.58 0.562 
Control Vs. Mind: diff * BeliefsDiff 0.17 0.42 0.41 0.681 
FilmCritic * BeliefsDiff -0.01 0.00 -2.92 0.005 
Control Vs. Mind: diff * FilmCritic * 
BeliefsDiff 0.00 0.01 -0.15 0.881 
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Table 10. Relationship between Reactions (mean centered) and watching 
preferences before receiving film critic information (Watch Pre).  
  b se t(55) p-value r 
Steam Intercept 4.16 0.16 25.36 < .001  
 Reactions 0.82 0.08 10.00 < .001 0.80 
Scissors Intercept 6.97 0.13 51.88 < .001  
 Reactions 1.00 0.08 11.98 < .001 0.85 
Rachel Intercept 4.44 0.13 33.29 < .001  
 Reactions 1.09 0.06 18.44 < .001 0.93 
Silk Intercept 5.93 0.18 32.38 < .001  
 Reactions 1.05 0.10 10.83 < .001 0.83 
 
Table 11. Relationship between Reactions (mean centered) and watching 
preferences after receiving film critic information (Watch Post) for the control 
condition.  The point here is that the relationship between reactions and watching 
preferences doesn’t change much as a function of receiving film critic 
information (the intercepts change because of the film critic information).  
Looking at the findings in the next table, it becomes clear that mindfulness 
changes the slope, but not the intercept.    
  b se t(16) p-value r 
Steam Intercept 4.11 0.52 7.85 < .001  
 Reactions 0.57 0.28 2.05 .057 0.46 
Scissors Intercept 5.19 0.34 15.34 < .001  
 Reactions 0.81 0.21 3.95 .001 0.70 
Rachel Intercept 6.03 0.51 11.81 < .001  
 Reactions 0.89 0.25 3.58 .003 0.67 
Silk Intercept 4.59 0.38 12.14 < .001  
 Reactions 0.83 0.20 4.04 .001 0.71 
 
 
Table 12. Relationship between Reactions (mean centered) and watching 
preferences after receiving film critic information (Watch Post) as a function of 
mindfulness.  Performing these analyses separately for each movie, none of the 
interactions are significant.  Note also that reactions, on average, predict 
watching preference after receiving film critic information similarly as reactions 
predict watching preference before receiving film critic information (see Table 
10).    
Steam b se t(51) p-value ηpartial2 
Intercept 3.80 0.25 15.01 < .001 0.815 
Mind: same Vs. diff. 0.12 0.31 0.41 .686 0.003 
Control Vs. Mind 0.16 0.18 0.86 .395 0.014 
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React 0.65 0.13 5.04 < .001 0.332 
Control Vs. Mind * React -0.04 0.10 -0.45 .655 0.004 
Mind: same Vs. diff.* React -0.06 0.15 -0.40 .692 0.003 
Scissors      
Intercept 5.28 0.25 21.47 < .001 0.900 
Mind: same Vs. diff. 0.05 0.30 0.16 .874 < 0.001 
Control Vs. Mind -0.05 0.18 -0.26 .797 0.001 
React 1.02 0.16 6.38 < .001 0.444 
Control Vs. Mind * React -0.11 0.11 -0.94 .352 0.017 
Mind: same Vs. diff.* React -0.05 0.20 -0.25 .808 0.001 
Rachel      
Intercept 5.41 0.27 20.02 < .001 0.887 
Mind: same Vs. diff. 0.31 0.33 0.94 .351 0.017 
Control Vs. Mind 0.31 0.19 1.62 .111 0.049 
React 0.72 0.12 5.98 < .001 0.412 
Control Vs. Mind * React 0.08 0.09 0.89 .378 0.015 
Mind: same Vs. diff.* React -0.17 0.14 -1.19 .240 0.027 
Silk      
Intercept 4.56 0.23 20.20 < .001 0.891 
Mind: same Vs. diff. 0.12 0.27 0.43 .671 0.004 
Control Vs. Mind 0.02 0.16 0.09 .928 < 0.001 
React 1.01 0.12 8.27 < .001 0.577 
Control Vs. Mind * React -0.09 0.09 -1.05 .297 0.022 
Mind: same Vs. diff.* React -0.14 0.15 -0.97 .337 0.018 
 
 
Table 13. Overview of descriptive and inferential statistics for reactions, 
watching preference before and after receiving film critic information for the 
control condition, mindful (same domain), and mindful (different domain).  
  Reactions Watch Pre Watch Post 
Steam Control 4.47 (1.94) 4.17 (1.92) 4.11 (2.42) 
 Mindful (same domain) 4.60 (2.33) 4.30 (2.23) 3.85 (2.25) 
 Mindful (diff. domain) 4.34 (1.84) 4.00 (2.11) 3.42 (2.19) 
Scissors Control 6.78 (1.66) 6.83 (1.82) 4.94 (1.92) 
 Mindful (same domain) 7.15 (1.86) 7.15 (2.03) 5.45 (2.67) 
 Mindful (diff. domain) 7.29 (1.32) 6.89 (1.94) 5.53 (2.63) 
Rachel Control 4.28 (2.12) 4.72 (2.63) 5.94 (2.82) 
 Mindful (same domain) 4.28 (2.31) 4.25 (2.86) 5.35 (2.48) 
 Mindful (diff. domain) 4.58 (2.48) 4.37 (2.63) 4.95 (2.53) 
Silk Control 5.75 (1.86) 5.94 (2.60) 4.28 (2.16) 
 Mindful (same domain) 6.32 (2.21) 5.84 (2.50) 4.84 (2.61) 
 Mindful (diff. domain) 6.29 (1.68) 6.00 (2.29) 4.63 (2.75) 
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M.E. of 
mindfulness 
(vs. control) 
M.E. of 
Reactions, 
Watch Pre, 
Watch Post Int. Post hoc comparison 
Steam 
F(2,108)=4.53 
p=.013  
ηpartial2= .077 F<1 F<1 React diff. Watch Post 
Scissors 
F(2,108)=50.08 
p<.001  
ηpartial2= .481 F<1 F<1 
React diff. Watch Post  
Watch Pre diff. Watch 
Post 
Rachel 
F(2,108)=11.40 
p<.001  
ηpartial2= .174 F<1.3 F<1.3 
React diff. Watch Post  
Watch Pre diff. Watch 
Post 
Silk 
F(2,108)=28.55 
p<.001  
ηpartial2= .350 F<1 F<1 
React diff. Watch Post  
Watch Pre diff. Watch 
Post 
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Need for Cognition Scale (NFC):  
 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you.  If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at 
all like you) please write a "1" to the left of the question; if the statement is 
extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a"5" next to the 
question.  Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor 
extremely characteristic of you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the 
scale that describes the best fit.   
Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below:  
1 = extremely uncharacteristic;  
2 = somewhat uncharacteristic;  
3 = uncertain;  
4 = somewhat characteristic;  
5 = extremely characteristic. 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. ____ 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. ____ 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. ____ 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities. ____ 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will 
have to think in depth about something. ____ 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. ____ 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. ____ 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. ____ 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. ____ 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
____ 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
____ 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. ____ 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. ____ 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. ____ 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. ____ 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot 
of mental effort. ____ 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why 
it works. ____ 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. ____ 
